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Introduction 
This thesis consists of four empirical essays within the broad field of modern labor 
economics. All four essays are self-contained and can be read independently of the others. 
Chapter 1 investigates the distinct effects on information technology and communication 
technology on firm’s skill demand. Chapter 2 studies whether the observed wage gab 
between majors in human arts and other fields are caused by their education per se or by 
selection. Chapter 3 examines taxable income responses to variation in marginal tax rates. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the effect of income taxation on the international migration of top 
earners. Each chapter provides an independent and separate analytical contribution to their 
specific field.  A detailed description of each chapter’s contribution to the existing literature 
is not included here. For that, I refer to the chapters themselves.  
 Although both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 studies behavioral responses to individual 
taxation, the four chapters are not closely related by topic. However, they all share one key 
feature. That is, the empirical analysis in all chapters is based on Danish micro data. These 
data are administered and maintained by Statistics Denmark that has gathered the data from 
a number administrative registers, including the Integrated Database for Labor Market 
Research (IDA), the Income Tax Registry and the Danish Student Registry. To facilitate 
register-based research Statistics Denmark provides access to these data to researchers and 
analysts in authorized environments. The data set runs from 1980 to 2009 and covers the 
entire population of individuals in Denmark. For each individual, the data set contains 
complete data on educational and labor market histories along with detailed information on 
a large set of socio-economic variables as well as comprehensive income and tax return 
information. From 1995 onwards, detailed information for all firms in Denmark is also 
available. These data can be linked to individuals to form a matched employer-employee 
data set.  
 Below I describe the four chapters in further detail, emphasizing how the Danish 
micro data along with the institutional setting and sharp policy reforms combine to make 
Denmark a very useful laboratory for studying the issues at hand in this thesis. By doing so, 
I also hope that it will become clear that the chapters are also interrelated in terms of 
empirical methodology. 
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In Chapter 1, I propose the hypothesis that firms’ use of information technology (IT) leads 
to skill-upgrading, while their use of communication technology (CT) leads to skill-
downgrading. This is in contrast to existing literature on the skill content of technological 
changes that typically assumes that all types of ICT have the same impact on firm’s 
demand for human capital.  
 I empirically test the hypothesis using a panel date set of more than 6,000 Danish 
firms over the years 2002-2008 that merges the administrative matched employer-employee 
data set with ICT expenditure surveys that have also been collected by Statistics Denmark. 
These data combine three key advantages relative to the data that have been used in 
previous studies of the impact of ICT on skill demand. First, the data contain detailed 
information on skill characteristics and wages for each worker at a given firm. Second, the 
data contain disaggregated ICT expenditures on various subcomponents of ICT at the firm 
level, which allow me to distinguish between IT and CT. Finally, these data allows me to 
follow firms’ use of IT, CT and skills over time.  
 As no obvious natural experiment exists, I rely on differential changes in the quality-
adjusted prices of IT and CT to identify the effects of IT and CT on skill demand. The idea 
behind this empirical strategy is that differential changes in the quality-adjusted prices of IT 
and CT, which have been far from negligible over the past couple of decades, create 
different incentives for firms to adopt IT and CT. Estimating a translog cost function using 
ordinary least squares (OLS), I provide empirical evidence that confirms the hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, a potential problem with the empirical strategy is that omitted variables and 
measurement error may still explain some of the correlations I find. To try to make 
additional headway, I employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach to the issue at hand. 
Specifically, I use industry-level measures of IT and CT as instruments for firm-level IT 
and CT. However, employing this IV strategy does not to alter the simple OLS results.     
 Although I view this analysis as a useful first step given the lack of evidence of this 
issue, there are many extensions in this line of research that could be pursued. First, 
additional empirical work analyzing natural experiments is needed to more carefully 
identify the causal effects of IT and CT on skill demand. One could perhaps utilize the 
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liberalization/deregulation of the telecommunication industry that has taken place over the 
last decades in Denmark and many other countries as natural experiments, generating 
exogenous differences in the effective price of telecommunication over time and across 
countries. Second, an important area for future research is to study the distinct effects of 
different types of ICT on not only skill demand but also productivity, firm organization and 
wage inequality.   
 
In Chapter 2, we study whether the observed wage gab between majors in human arts and 
other fields are caused by their education per se or by selection, using the Danish micro 
data. OLS estimates for Denmark suggests that the raw wage gab between human arts 
majors and other majors is about 20%. The Danish educational system is particularly well 
suited for studying the returns to different types of education. The reason is that university 
degrees in Denmark are highly specialized. For example, if one chooses to study economics 
then this is the subject matter pursued throughout the entire time at the university; both 
during undergraduate and the graduate level. Intellectual excursions into other fields only 
occur to a very modest extent, in contrast to what may the case under e.g. a US-type 
system. Consequently, examining the labor market performance of Danes holding different 
types of tertiary education is likely to convey information about the extent of human capital 
production within different fields of study. In addition, Danish universities are publicly 
funded which reduces the scope for marked quality differences.  
 Accordingly, we attempt to elicit information about the causal effect of the field of 
study on individual productivity, as it manifests itself in individual wages. OLS estimates 
are unlikely to capture the causal effect of the type of education on individual productivity, 
unless relative cognitive abilities are controlled for. Accordingly, we try to control for 
comparative intellectual advantages by invoking individual-level information about 
academic specialization in the Danish high school system, high school attended, high 
school GPA, and parental education. Still, a significant wage difference between human 
arts majors and other majors persist. Ultimately, it is hard to rule out that other – 
unobserved – factors could simultaneously impact on the choice of education as well as 
productivity. As in Chapter 1, we therefore employ an IV approach. We document that 
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individuals’ educational choice is correlated with that of older students in high school, 
suggestive of peer effects. Conditional on high school fixed effects, this link is unlikely to 
affect post-university wage and thereby constitutes a plausible instrument for the 
educational choice. With this instrument in hand, we proceed to estimate the impact of 
choosing an education in the humanities by 2SLS. Our 2SLS estimates differ substantially 
from the conventional OLS counterparts. After instrumenting the wage difference between 
human arts majors and other majors disappears. Hence, we are led to the following 
conclusion: the relative poor performance of human arts majors in the Danish labor market 
is mainly due to selection rather than to low human capital production at universities.  
 Our analysis raises new questions worth exploring in future research. First, wage 
differences seem to be related to relative cognitive abilities; mathematics appears to be 
important, for example. But why is that? Is it because such abilities are relatively scarce in 
the population or because they are particularly productive? If the latter is the case, then it 
would be useful to try and discern why such abilities are in high demand. Second, how are 
relative abilities in, e.g., math and human science formed? as they determine both 
educational choice and wages, it would be useful to know whether these cognitive traits 
have a genetic origin, or are acquired during primary and secondary schooling. If the 
former is the case, education policies cannot be invoked to influence them; end conversely 
if relative talents are acquired.  
 
In Chapter 3, we study taxable income responses using administrative data that link tax 
return information to detailed socioeconomic information for the entire Danish population 
over the years 1984-2005. The identifying variation is provided by a series of Danish tax 
reforms – the 1987, 1994, 1999 and 2004 reforms – that create substantial tax variation 
across individuals, income forms, and over time. The identifying variation provided by the 
Danish tax reforms does not feature the same strong correlation between tax changes and 
income levels as the tax reforms in the U.S. (and other countries) that have been 
extensively studied in the past two decades. Arguably, this allows us to overcome the 
identification problems arising from non-tax changes in the income distribution and mean-
reversion that plague much of the existing literature.  
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 To estimate the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax, we use a 
difference-in-differences approach that relates changes in taxable income over time to 
changes in marginal tax rates over time for individual taxpayers. Because of the 
nonlinearity of the Danish tax system, the marginal tax rate is endogenous to the choice of 
taxable income. We therefore construct instruments for the marginal tax rate using 
mechanical tax changes driven only by changes in tax laws. Subsequently, we estimate our 
model using 2SLS, as in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.  
 Our main findings are the following. First, labor income elasticities are modest seen 
over the full time period, around 0.05 for wage earners and 0.10 for self-employed 
individuals. Second, capital income elasticities are about 2-3 times larger than labor income 
elasticities. Third, behavioral responses (both labor and capital) are substantially larger 
when estimated from large tax reform episodes versus small tax reform episodes. This 
finding is consistent with the argument that elasticities estimated from small tax changes 
are attenuated by optimization frictions (e.g. adjustment cost and inattention), whereas large 
tax changes are likely to overcome such frictions and hence reveal the true long-run 
elasticity. We find that a particularly large and salient tax reform in the late 1980s is 
associated with a population wide elasticity of labor income of about 0.12, whereas a series 
of smaller tax reforms in the 1990s and 2000s are associated with a labor income elasticity 
of only 0.02. Fourth, cross-tax effects between labor and capital income are in general 
weak, with a small degree of complementarity between the two income forms for wage 
earners and a small degree of substitutability for self-employed individuals. Since income 
shifting for tax avoidance purposes by itself would imply substitutability, our results 
suggest that income shifting is more prevalent for the self-employed than for wage earners.      
 
In Chapter 4, we estimate the effect of taxation on international migration of top earners. 
As in Chapter 3, the identifying variation is generated by Danish tax policy changes. 
Specifically, we use the Danish Tax Scheme for Foreign Researchers and Key Employees 
(Forskerordningen) – the Researchers’ Tax Scheme for short – which offers preferential tax 
treatment to foreign scientist and high-income foreigners in other professions working in 
Denmark. This scheme, which started on June 1, 1991, allows foreigners (and in some 
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cases Danes, who have been abroad) with incomes above a certain threshold (about 
103,000 Euros as of 2009) to be taxed at a flat rate of 25% for a total period of up to 3 years 
instead of the regular progressive schedule, where workers with earnings above the scheme 
threshold would face average income tax rates around 55%. The earnings eligibility 
threshold does not apply to researchers.  
 This unusual piece of tax policy implies large discontinuities in tax liabilities 
depending on the contract start date (before and after June 1, 1991), duration of stay in 
Denmark (3-year rules), earnings level (earnings eligibility threshold), and occupation 
(researchers versus other professions). Hence, the reform creates very large quasi-
experimental variation along several different dimensions, and provides a very powerful 
way of identifying the effect of taxation on migration. It is very unusual to have large 
discontinuities in tax liability (as opposed to discontinuities in marginal tax rates) in tax 
systems. We explore the different aspects of the tax scheme using quasi-experimental 
techniques such as bunching approaches and difference-in-differences. For this analysis, we 
have access to the standard administrative data for the entire population of Danish residents 
(Danish citizens and foreigners) since 1980. In addition, the data set have been augmented 
with variables relating specifically to the Researchers’ Tax Scheme, which the Danish tax 
authorities (SKAT) have made available specifically to this project.     
 Our analysis of the Danish Researchers’ Tax Scheme for foreigners yields two main 
results. First and most important, we obtain compelling evidence that the scheme have 
almost doubled the number of highly paid foreigners relative to slightly less paid ineligible 
foreigners, which translates into a very large elasticity of migration with respect to the net-
of-tax rate in excess of one. Second, we show that there is bunching of earnings at the 
scheme eligibility threshold and bunching of durations of stay at the three year duration 
limit. In the end, the migration elasticity is much larger than the conventional within 
country elasticity of reported earnings found in the literature in general as well as in 
Chapter 3. Hence, preferential tax schemes for highly paid workers could generate very 
harmful tax competition across European countries and severely limit the ability of 
European governments to use progressive taxation. This will require international 
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coordination and the design of rules regulating such schemes particularly in the European 
Union. 
 Another important rationale put forward by the Danish tax authorities as well as other 
European governments which have adopted similar preferential tax scheme for highly paid 
foreigners is that highly skilled workers generate positive externalities on their co-workers 
and the economy at large. Therefore, in future work, we hope to make progress on 
estimating spillovers of scheme-workers on co-workers and broader economic growth in 
two ways. First, we could use a Bartik type instrument measure for the exposure of each 
industry or firm to the scheme. The instrument would be the fraction of highly paid foreign 
workers in the industry or individual firm just before the introduction of the scheme. This 
would allow us to measure the effect of attracting scheme workers on wage dynamics of 
domestic workers or non eligible foreigners as well as firms' hiring and growth behavior. 
Second, we plan to study specifically the researcher part of the scheme that we have not 
analyzed in this paper. We plan to analyze the effect of the influx of researchers in 
Denmark on the patents, publications, and placement of Ph.D. candidates of Danish 
research centers vs. comparable European countries such as Sweden. The comparison could 
be done across academic fields using the pre-scheme fraction of foreign researchers across 
fields. To carry out these analyses, our data set would have to be augmented with the 
administrative matched employer-employee data set, which is used in Chapter 1.     
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Summary 
Chapter 1: Not All Technologies Are Alike: Distinguishing the Effects of Information 
Technology and Communication Technology on Skill Demand 
Existing empirical studies on the skill content of technological changes typically assumes 
that all types of information and communication technology (ICT) have the same impact on 
firm’s demand for human capital.  
 In this chapter, I propose and test the alternative hypothesis that information 
technology (IT) complements high-skilled labor, while communication technology (CT) 
substitutes high-skilled labor. The reasoning underlying this hypothesis is straightforward. 
Through improved access to information, IT will tend to increase the skill requirements of 
workers, as they have to handle more information and solve more of the problems they face 
without relying on others. Conversely, by facilitating communication, CT will tend to 
reduce the skill requirements of workers, as they can specialize further and rely more on 
others when solving problems.  
 I empirically test the hypothesis using a panel data set of Danish firms over the years 
2002-2008 that merge an administrative matched employer-employee data set with ICT 
expenditure surveys. The empirical analysis provides evidence that support my hypothesis. 
Using a translog cost function framework, I document that increases in IT increase the 
relative demand for high-skilled labor, while increases in CT reduce the relative demand for 
high-skilled labor. I also show that employing instruments for IT and CT, considering 
alternative specifications and samples, and controlling for potential confounding factors 
does not seem to alter this result. Furthermore, I show that the demand for skills is being 
driven by changes in both employment and wages. Moreover, I find that these effects are 
non-trivial: IT account for about 24 percent of the change in skill demand, while CT 
account for about – 14 percent. It thus seems that IT and CT are indeed heterogeneous 
technologies in relation to skill demand. Moreover, the analysis suggests that falling to 
account for the differential impact of IT and CT can potentially be a serious error.  
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Chapter 2: Do Human Arts Really Offer a Lower Return to Education? (Co-authored 
with Carl-Johan Dalgaard and Anders Sørensen) 
In this chapter, we study whether the observed wage gab between majors in human arts and 
other majors are caused by education per se. Baseline OLS regressions reveal that students 
of human art fare the worst in the Danish labor market with an hourly wage rate about 20 
percent below that of graduates within other majors. 
 However, one may suspect that the partial correlation between the type of education 
and wages does not convey accurate information about human capital production. If the 
selection into educational types in non-random, the OLS estimates will be biased. Our 
analysis confirms that selection seems to be at work. Socioeconomic circumstances, 
absolute ability (measured by high school GPA) and relative cognitive abilities (measured 
by high school course work) influence the choice of education type. 
 Consequently, we invoke instruments for education type to address the selection 
problem. We document that individuals’ educational choice is correlated with that of older 
students in high school, suggestive of peer effects. Conditional on high school fixed effects, 
this link is unlikely to affect post-university wages and thereby constitutes a plausible 
instrument for the educational choice. Strikingly, once education type is instrumented, we 
find no significant difference in the wage gab between human arts majors and other majors. 
This result suggests that a tertiary degree in humanities do not provide individuals with 
significantly less productive human capital than other types of tertiary education. 
Accordingly, the relatively poor performance of human arts majors in the Danish labor 
market is mainly due to selection according to relative cognitive abilities, rather than to low 
human capital production at universities. 
 
Chapter 3: Estimating Taxable Income Responses Using Danish Tax Reforms (Co-
authored with Henrik Jacobsen Kleven)  
In this chapter, we present evidence on taxable income responses, using administrative data 
that link tax return information to detailed socioeconomic information for the entire Danish 
population over 22 years. The identifying variation is provided by a series of tax reforms 
that provide substantial tax variation across individuals, income forms, and over time. The 
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identifying variation provided by the Danish tax reforms does not feature the same strong 
correlation between tax changes and income levels as the tax reforms in the U.S. and many 
other countries that have been extensively studied in the past two decades. Arguably, this 
allows us to overcome the identification problems arising from non-tax changes in the 
income distribution and mean-reversion that plague much of the existing literature. Unlike 
previous studies, our results are very robust to the specification of controls for non-tax 
changes in the income distribution and mean-reversion, which suggests that we have 
controlled in a sufficiently rich way for non-tax factors impacting on reported income. The 
Danish setting therefore offers a useful laboratory for a credible identification of taxable 
income responses. 
  Our main findings are the following. First, labor income elasticities are modest seen 
over the full period, around 0.05 for wage earners and 0.10 for self-employed individuals. 
Second, capital income elasticities are about 2-3 times larger than labor income elasticities. 
Third, behavioral elasticities (both labor and capital) are substantially larger when 
estimated from large tax reform episodes than for small tax reform episodes. This is 
consistent with the idea that responses to small tax changes are attenuated by optimization 
frictions such as adjustment costs and inattention, whereas large tax changes are likely to 
overcome such frictions and hence reveal the true long-run elasticity. Fourth, cross-tax 
effects between labor and capital income are in general weak, but suggests that income 
shifting is more prevalent for the self-employed than for wage earners.    
 
Chapter 4: Taxation and International Migration of Top Earners: Evidence from the 
Foreigner Tax Scheme in Denmark (co-authored with Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Camille 
Landais and Emmanuel Saez) 
In this chapter, we analyze the effects of income taxation on the international migration of 
top earners using the Danish preferential foreigner tax scheme. This scheme, introduced in 
1991, allows immigrants with high earnings (above 103,000 Euros per year as of 2009) to 
be taxed at a flat rate of 25% for a duration of three years instead of the regular progressive 
schedule with a top marginal tax rate of 59%. Using population wide Danish administrative 
tax data, we show that the scheme doubled the number of highly paid foreigners in 
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Denmark relative to slightly less paid ineligible foreigners, which translates into a very 
large elasticity of migration with respect to net-of-tax rate in excess of one. There is 
bunching of earnings at the scheme eligibility threshold, evidence of a significant but 
quantitatively very small response along the intensive earnings margin (work effort or 
earnings manipulation through tax avoidance). There is also evidence of sharp bunching of 
durations of stay at the three year duration response. In the end, the migration elasticity is 
much larger than the conventional within country elasticity of earnings with respect to the 
net-of-tax rate (cf. Chapter 3). Hence, preferential tax schemes for highly paid workers 
could generate harmful tax competition across European countries and severely limit the 
ability of European government to use progressive taxation. 
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Summary in Danish (resumé) 
Denne afhandling består af fire selvstændige kapitler, der alle omhandler emner inden for 
moderne arbejdsmarkedsøkonomi.  
 
Kapitel 1: Not All Technologies Are Alike: Distinguishing the Effects of Information 
Technology and Communication Technology on Skill Demand 
Eksisterende empiriske studier af effekten af teknologiske ændringer på virksomhedernes 
arbejdskraftefterspørgsel antager typisk, at alle typer af ny teknologi har den samme effekt 
på virksomhedernes efterspørgsel efter arbejdskraft. 
 I dette kapitel opstilles og testes en alternativ hypotese om, at informationsteknologi 
(IT) øger den relative efterspørgsel efter højtuddannet arbejdskraft, mens kommunikations-
teknologi (KT) reducerer den relative efterspørgsel efter højtuddannet arbejdskraft. 
Baggrunden for den hypotese er ganske enkel. Gennem forbedret adgang til information, vil 
IT tendentielt øge kvalifikationskravene til virksomhedernes medarbejdere, idet de skal 
være i stand til at håndtere mere information og løse flere af de opgaver, de står over for, 
uden støtte fra andre. Ved at fremme kommunikationen, vil CT omvendt have tendens til at 
reducere de kvalifikationskrav, virksomhederne stiller til deres medarbejdere, idet 
medarbejderne har mulighed for at specialisere sig yderligere og være mere afhængige af 
andre, når de løser opgaver.  
 Hypotesen testes ved hjælp af et datasæt, hvor det er muligt at følge danske 
virksomhedernes brug af IT, KT og arbejdskraft over årene 2002-2008. Den empiriske 
analyse understøtter hypotesen om, at stigninger i IT øger den relative efterspørgsel efter 
højtuddannet arbejdskraft, mens stigninger i KT reducerer den relative efterspørgsel efter 
højtuddannet arbejdskraft. Dette resultat er særdeles robust. Desuden viser analysen, at 
efterspørgslen efter højtuddannet arbejdskraft er drevet af ændringer i både beskæftigelse 
og lønninger. Endeligt viser analysen, at størrelsesordnen af disse effekter ikke er 
ubetydelige: IT kan forklare ca. 24 procent af den ændrede efterspørgsel efter højtuddannet 
arbejdskraft, mens KT kan forklare ca. -10 procent. På denne baggrund konkluderes, at IT 
and KT har modsatrettede effekter på efterspørgslen efter højtuddannet arbejdskraft. 
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Dermed peger analysen også på, at det potentielt kan føre til fejlslutninger, hvis man ikke 
skelner mellem effekterne af IT og KT, når man vurderer effekterne af ny teknologi.   
 
Kapitel 2: Do Human Arts Really Offer a Lower Return to Education? (skrevet 
sammen med Carl-Johan Dalgaard og Anders Sørensen) 
I dette kapitel undersøges, om den lønforskel, der kan observeres for personer med 
humanistiske uddannelser og andre kandidatretninger, skyldes uddannelsestyperne i sig selv 
eller underliggende evner, der på samme tid påvirker valget af uddannelsestype og lønnen 
på arbejdsmarkedet. Simple OLS regressioner viser, at humanister i gennemsnit har en 
timeløn, der er omkring 20 procent lavere end kandidater med andre uddannelsesretninger. 
 Dog kan man have mistanke om, at de underliggende faktorer, der påvirker personers 
uddannelsesvalg, også påvirker vedkommende lønindkomst, uafhængigt af denne 
uddannelse. Hvis det er tilfældet, vil simple OLS regressioner for afkastet af uddannelse 
være misvisende, idet hele lønafkastet tilskrives kandidatretningen i sig selv, selvom den 
også skyldes andre bagvedliggende faktorer. For at løse dette potentielle selektionsproblem 
anvender vi instrumenter for valget af uddannelsestype. Vi dokumenterer, at den enkeltes 
uddannelsesvalg bliver påvirket af ældre elevers uddannelsesvalg på vedkommendes 
gymnasium.  Når der tages højde for hvilket gymnasium, den enkelte gik på, påvirker ældre 
elevers uddannelsesvalg næppe yngre elevers løn efter de har opnået en kandidatgrad, og 
dermed udgør det et plausibelt instrument for valg af uddannelse.  
 En smule overraskende finder vi, at lønforskellen mellem humanister og andre 
kandidater bliver statistik insignifikant, når man instrumenterer for valget af uddannelse. 
Dette resultat tyder således på, at lønforskellen mellem personer med humanistiske 
uddannelser og andre kandidatretninger snarere skyldes selektionen indtil uddannelsestyper 
end selve uddannelserne i sig selv.  
 
Kapitel 3: Estimating Taxable Income Responses Using Danish Tax Reforms (skrevet 
sammen med Henrik Jacobsen Kleven)  
I dette kapitel estimeres elasticiteten af skattepligtige indkomster ved hjælp af registerdata 
for hele den danske befolkning i perioden 1984-2005. Den variation i skatterne, som 
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anvendes til at identificere effekterne af ændrede skatter, stammer fra en række danske 
skattereformer, der har skabt betydelig skattevariation både over tid og på tværs af individer 
og indkomstformer. Variationen i skatterne fra de danske skattereformer har ikke den 
samme stærke korrelation mellem skatteændringer og indkomstniveau som de 
skattereformer i USA og andre lande, der har ligget til grund for mange af de tidligere 
studier af elasticiteten af skattepligtige indkomster. Det giver os mulighed for at overvinde 
de identifikationsproblemer, der har plaget tidligere studier og som opstår som følge af 
ikke-skattedrevne ændringer i indkomstfordelingen og mean-reversion. I modsætning til 
tidligere studier, er vores resultater meget robuste overfor valget af kontrol for ikke-
skattedrevne ændringer i indkomstfordelingen og mean-reversion. Det peger på, at vi er i 
stand til at kontrollere tilstrækkeligt for faktorer, der påvirker skattepligtige indkomster, 
men som ikke er direkte relateret til ændringer i skattesystemet. Kombinationen af de 
danske registerdata og de gennemførte skattereformer giver os således mulighed for at opnå 
en troværdig identifikation af de adfærdsmæssige effekter af beskatning.  
 Vores vigtigste resultater er følgende. For det første finder vi, at elasticiteten af 
arbejdsindkomst er ganske beskeden set over hele perioden. For lønmodtagere er den 
omkring 0,05, mens den for selvstændige er 0,10. For det andet er elasticiteten af 
kapitalindkomst to-tre gange større end elasticiteten af arbejdsindkomst. For det tredje viser 
vi, at adfærdsmæssige effekter (både for arbejds- og kapitalindkomst), der estimeres på 
baggrund af store skatteændringer, er væsentligt større end adfærdsmæssige responser, der 
estimeres på baggrund af små skatteændringer. Dette er konsistent med idéen om, at 
effekten af små skatteændringer reduceres på grund af optimeringsfriktioner (fx 
tilpasningsomkostninger), mens store skatteændringer i højere grad må forventes at 
overvinde sådanne friktioner og dermed ligge tættere på den faktiske, langsigtede 
elasticitet. Endeligt finder vi, at krydspriseffekterne mellem arbejds- og kapitalindkomst 
generelt set er små. Der er dog tendens til, at indkomstflytning mellem indkomstformer er 
mere udbredt blandt selvstændige end blandt lønmodtagere.  
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Kapitel 4: Taxation and International Migration of Top Earners: Evidence from the 
Foreigner Tax Scheme in Denmark (skrevet sammen med Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, 
Camille Landais and Emmanuel Saez) 
Med udgangspunkt i bruttoskatteordningen for forskere og nøglemedarbejdere i Danmark 
(ofte betegnet forskerordningen), undersøges i dette kapitel effekten af indkomstbeskatning 
på migrationsbeslutningen blandt højtlønnede. Ordningen, som blev indført i 1991, giver 
udlændinge (og under særlige omstændigheder også hjemvendte danske statsborgere) med 
høje lønninger (over 103.000 Euro om året i 2009) mulighed for at lade sig beskatte med 25 
pct. af bruttoindkomsten i en periode på op til 3 år i stedet for det almindelige progressive 
skattesystem, hvor den øverste marginalskat er på 59 pct. På baggrund af registerdata for 
hele befolkningen finder vi, at ordningen har fordoblet antallet af højtlønnede udlændinge i 
Danmark relativt til antallet af udlændinge med lønninger lige under lønkravet. Dette 
resulterer i en migrationselasticitet med hensyn til efterskattesatsen på over én. Vi finder 
også en ophobning af lønningen lige omkring ordningens lønkrav, hvilket er bevis for en 
signifikant, men kvantitativt set ganske lille respons langs den intensive margin 
(arbejdsindsats eller lønmanipulation via skatteunddragelse). Endeligt finder vi, at der sker 
en betydelig ophobning af varigheden af opholdet i Danmark lige omkring de 3 år. I sidste 
ende er migrationselasticiteten betydeligt højere end traditionelle indkomstelasticiteter, der 
ikke tager højde for migrationsbeslutningen (jf. Kapitel 3). Derfor er der risiko for, at 
ordninger, der begunstiger højtlønnede skattemæssigt, kan skabe skadelig 
skattekonkurrence på tværs af især europæiske lande og dermed begrænse de enkelte landes 
mulighed for at anvende progressiv beskatning. 
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Abstract
Existing empirical studies on the e¤ect of information and communication tech-
nologies (ICTs) on skill demand assumes that ICT is one homogenous technology.
However, this paper provides empirical evidence that ICT is a heterogeneous tech-
nology. Specically, I propose and test the alternative hypothesis that information
technologies (ITs) complement skills and communication technologies (CTs) substi-
tute skills. Using a novel panel data set on Danish rms over the years 2002-2008, I
o¤er support for this hypothesis. I document that IT leads to skill-upgrading, while
CT leads to skill-downgrading. These e¤ects are being driven by changes in both
employment and wages. I also show that these e¤ects are non-trivial: IT accounts
for about 24 percent of the growth in skill demand over the period 2002-2008, while
CT accounts for up to -14 percent of this growth. These ndings demonstrate that
IT and CT have heterogeneous e¤ects on skill demand. More generally, these re-
sults suggest that relying on aggregate measures of ICT to study the e¤ects of new
technologies could be a serious error.
Keywords: skill demand; information technology; communication technology.
JEL Classication codes: C23; J23; O33.
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1 Introduction
The e¤ects of information and communication technologies (ICT) on skill demand are
important inputs in macroeconomic models and policy analysis. More than two decades
of empirical studies document a strong positive relationship between ICT and the relative
demand for high-skilled labor (e.g., Berman, Bound and Griliches 1994; Autor, Katz
and Krueger 1998; Machin and Van Reenen 1998). The traditional interpretation of this
evidence is that ICT is complementary with human capital and rapid falls in quality-
adjusted ICT prices have therefore increased the relative demand for high-skilled labor.
This has led to the hypothesis of technology-skill complementarity (see Goldin and Katz
1998 for a detailed discussion of this hypothesis).1
Recently, a more nuanced view has been proposed by Autor, Levy andMurnane (2003),
who argues that ICT substitutes for routine tasks that can be easily described by explicit
rules but complements non-routine tasks that are not readily programmable. Because
most non-routine job tasks are performed by either low-skilled labor (e.g., housekeepers
and cab drivers) or high-skilled labor (e.g., consultants and physicians) and many routine
job tasks are performed by medium-skilled labor (e.g., bank clerks), this hypothesis implies
a "polarization" of the labor market with employment shifting away from the medium-
skilled jobs and towards both the high-skilled and the low-skilled jobs. A large number of
recent papers have provided evidence that is broadly consistent with this "ICT-induced
polarization" hypothesis (e.g., Goos and Manning 2007, Spitz-Oener 2006, Goos, Manning
and Salomons 2009 and 2010, and Michaels, Natraj and Van Reenen 2010).
However, despite being simple and intuitively attractive, both the technology-skill
complementarity hypothesis and the ICT-induced polarization hypothesis rest on the ba-
1Another often cited force behind these demand shifts is skill-biased technological change (SBTC).
However, although SBTC and technology-skill complementarity are often confused in the literature, their
underlying nature is substantially di¤erent. Simply put, SBTC is related to changes in unobservable
factors and provides information on how technology a¤ects the relative e¢ ciency of inputs in the produc-
tion process, while technology-skill complementarity is related to changes in observable factors and yields
information on which inputs in the production process that can be easily substituted and complemented.
Yet another technology-based explanation is the skill-biased organizational change hypothesis, suggesting
that organizational changes provide the link between technology and skill demand (e.g. Caroli and Van
Reenen 2001, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2002).
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sic assumption that ICT is a homogenous technology. In this paper, I question whether
this assumption is indeed reasonable. Specically, I test the alternative hypothesis that
information technology (IT) complements human skills and communication technology
(CT) substitutes for human skills. The reasoning underlying this hypothesis is straight-
forward. On the one hand, by improving access to information, IT empowers workers to
handle more of the problems they face without relying on others, thereby increasing the
variety of tasks they have to perform in their jobs. On the other hand, CT makes it easier
for workers to communicate with each other, which in turn generates a reduction in the
variety of tasks workers have to deal with, as they can specialize further and rely more
on others. Consequently, IT and CT have di¤erential impacts not only on the variety of
tasks but also on the associated responsibility and uncertainty workers face in their jobs.
Because it is generally believed that a higher level of human capital of workers increases
their ability to deal more e¤ectively with an increased variety of job tasks, responsibility
and uncertainty, this suggests that IT complements skills and CT substitutes for skills.
Figure 1 provides a simple illustration of the hypothesis.
The idea that IT and CT are two distinct components of ICT has been proposed in
recent work. Based on a similar reasoning as above, Bloom et al. (2010) argue that IT
decentralizes rmsdecision making while CT centralizes rmsdecision making. Using
a data set of rms in the U.S. and seven Continental European countries, they provide
empirical evidence supporting their view. Moreover, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006
and 2010) show theoretically that improvements in IT leads to implications for wage in-
equality, rm organization and growth that are opposite to those from improvements in
CT. However, although there seems to be a growing interest in the underlying character-
istics of di¤erent components of ICT, there is no evidence on whether as well as how IT
and CT separately a¤ect skill demand. In this paper, I provide empirical evidence on this
subject by testing the hypothesis that IT leads to skill upgrading and CT leads to skill
downgrading.
I empirically test the hypothesis using a panel data set of Danish rms over the years
2002-2008 that merges an administrative matched employer-employee data set with ICT
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expenditure surveys. These data combine three key advantages relative to the data that
have been used in previous studies on the impact of ICT on skill demand. First, the data
contain detailed information on skill characteristics and wages for each worker at a given
rm. Second, the data contain disaggregated ICT expenditures on various subcomponents
of ICT at the rm level, which allow me to distinguish between IT and CT. Finally, as the
data cover ve industries (manufacturing, construction, trade, transportation and service),
the analysis is not limited to focusing on manufacturing as most previous studies.
As no natural experiment exists, I rely on di¤erential changes in the quality-adjusted
prices of IT and CT to identify the e¤ects of IT and CT on skill demand. The idea
behind this empirical strategy is that di¤erential changes in the quality-adjusted prices
of IT and CT create di¤erent incentives for rms to adopt IT and CT. These di¤erential
changes in IT and CT prices are far from negligible. To illustrate this, Figure 2 shows
the evolution of IT and CT prices in the U.S. As the gure makes clear, the price of IT
has decreased enormously over the past couple of decades, whereas the price of CT has
been very stable.2 Nevertheless, a potential problem with this empirical strategy is that
omitted variables and measurement error may still explain some of the correlations I nd,
so my results should be considered as suggestive correlations rather than causal e¤ects.
However, employing an instrumental variable (IV) strategy using industry-level measures
of IT and CT as instruments for rm-level IT and CT does not seem to alter the simple
OLS results.
The empirical analysis provides evidence that conrms my hypothesis. Using a translog
cost function framework, I nd that increases in IT increase a rms relative demand for
skills, while increases in CT reduce a rms relative demand for skills. I show that these
e¤ects are being driven by changes in both employment and wages. I also document
that these e¤ects are non-trivial: IT accounts for about 24 percent of the growth in skill
demand, while CT accounts for about -14 percent of this growth.
Taken as a whole, the empirical analysis suggests that IT leads to skill-upgrading and
2Unfortunately, similar disaggregated data does not exist for Denmark. However, given the com-
mon availability of ICT it seems reasonable to expect a broadly similar evolution of IT and CT prices
throughout the world.
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CT leads to skill-downgrading and therefore shows that ICT indeed is a heterogeneous
technology in relation to skill demand. More generally, this paper provides important new
insights into our understanding of how new technologies translate into higher demand for
skills.
Existing empirical studies on the skill content of technological change typically use
aggregate measures of ICT, often simply computers per employee or the share of ICT
expenditures in total investment or capital. The reason for this lack of attention on the
di¤erent subcomponents of ICT is probably due to data constraints, as these data are
rarely available, especially at the rm level. However, as I document in this paper, failing
to distinguish between IT and CT could potentially be problematic as the two can be
expected to have the opposite e¤ects on skill demand. A few recent papers focus on the
consequences of distinct types of ICT on productivity (Athey and Stern 2002, Jensen
2007, Garicano and Heaton 2010), but there have been no attempts to focus directly on
skills. One of the main contributions of this paper is that I have access to data with which
I can follow rmsuse of IT, CT and skills over time.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a simple skill demand
framework and derive an estimating equation that forms the basis for the empirical analy-
sis. Section 3 describes the Danish data and provide some institutional background.
Section 4 presents the empirical results, while section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Strategy
My goal is to measure the distinct impacts of changes in IT and CT on skill demand.
To do so, I use a translog cost function framework with two labor inputs (low-skilled
and high-skilled labor) and three capital inputs (IT, CT and non-ICT capital). This
framework is very useful for testing the hypothesis that IT complements skills and CT
substitutes skills because it allows di¤erent patterns of substitution and complementarity
between low-skilled and high-skilled labor. From this basic model, I derive an estimating
equation and discuss various identication issues.
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2.1 Simple Model
Consider the short-run cost function C:
(1) C = c(WH ;WL; IT; CT;K; Y )
where C is the total cost, WH is the wage of high-skilled labor, WLis the wage of low-
skilled labor, IT is IT capital, CT is CT capital, K is non-ICT capital and Y is value
added. Following Brown and Christensen (1981), I assume that the only variable inputs
are the two skill groups, whereas all types of capital are quasi-xed. The translog cost
function can now be dened as a second-order Taylors series approximation in logarithm
to an arbitrary cost function. Di¤erentiating the translog cost function by the wage of
each skill group, WN , and using Shephards Lemma, I obtain the following two wage-bill
share equations:
(2) SH = 'HH lnW
H + 'LH lnW
L + ITH ln IT + CTH lnCT + KH lnK + Y H lnY
(3) SL = 'HL lnW
H + 'LL lnW
L + ITL ln IT + CTL lnCT + KL lnK + Y L lnY
where SN is the wage-bill share of skill group N = fH;Lg. By imposing the standard
restrictions of symmetry and homogeneity of degree one in prices, one equation becomes
redundant and the wage-bill share equation for high-skilled labor can be written as3:
(4) SH = 'HH ln(W
H=WL) + ITH ln IT + CTH lnCT + KH lnK + Y H lnY
The model implies that the skill structure of a rms workforce, given the level of
output Y , depends on IT capital, CT capital, non-ICT capital and the relative wages
between high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor. The hypothesis that IT complements for
skills and CT substitutes for skills simply implies that ITH > 0 and CTH < 0.
3The estimates of the wage-bill share equation for low-skilled labor can be recovered from the symmetry
restriction without estimating the equation.
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2.2 Empirical Specication
For rm i at time t, the stochastic counterpart of the model is given by:
SHit = i + 'HH ln(W
H=WL)it + ITH ln ITit + CTH lnCTit + KH lnKit(5)
+Y H lnYit + "Hit
where i is the rm-specic xed e¤ects and " is the error term.
There are a number of econometric problems with estimating equation (5). First,
unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be correlated with both inputs and outputs (Mundlak
1961). For example, rms with better managers may nd it easier to increase IT and
reduce CT as well as rely less on low-skilled labor. To remove this "managerial ability"
(Bloom and Van Reenen 2007), I estimate the wage-bill share equation for high-skilled
labor in rst-di¤erenced form. Furthermore, I also include a set of rm characteristics
(rm size, union density, and export intensities) as well as industry-year and region-year
dummies. Moreover, I compare the wage-bill share equation with the employment share
equation to check whether the results are being driven by changes in employment, wages
or both.
Another issue is the treatment of wage variables. Since there is a direct relation
between the wage-bill share of high-skilled labor and wages, it is very likely that wages
are highly endogenous. Furthermore, wage variation across rms can be confused with
unobservable di¤erences in labor quality di¤erences. In other words, there is assumed to
be little exogenous variation in wages that is useful for the present analysis. Following
most of the previous literature that uses a similar framework (e.g., Machin and Van
Reenen 1998, and Caroli and Van Reenen 2001), I assume that labor markets are local
in scope and replace the relative wage term with region-year dummies. Any remaining
time-invariant rm-specic di¤erences in relative wages are assumed to be captured in
rm-specic xed e¤ects.
A third concern is the endogeneity of IT and CT. If IT and CT expenditures are chosen
on the basis of economic incentives, they are unlikely to be independent of the factors
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that inuence the rms decision to employ workers in di¤erent skill groups. As a result,
the unobservable factors that inuence the skill structure of rms workforce are likely to
be correlated with IT and CT, and the estimated coe¢ cients may su¤er from endogeneity
biases. A simple way to try to deal with this problem is to use lagged values of IT and
CT. However, if the capital stocks of IT and CT are persistent over time, it makes little
di¤erence for the results whether I use the lagged or contemporary values of IT and CT.
Furthermore, because the use of lagged values signicantly reduces the sample size, I
estimate the baseline model using current values of IT and CT. As robustness checks, I
try to deal with endogeneity using both one-year and two-year lagged values of IT and
CT as well as employing an IV approach.
Finally, another important concern is measurement error in IT and CT, causing atten-
uation bias. As with endogeneity, I try to deal with measurement error using instruments
for IT and CT.
The basic wage-bill equation of high-skilled labor can now be written as:
4SHit = 14 ln ITit + 24 lnCTit + 34 lnKit + 44 lnYit(6)
+1xit + 1INDjt + 2REGkt + uHit
where 4 is the rst-di¤erence operator, i indexes the rm, t the time period, j the
industry and k the region. x is a vector of rm characteristics, IND is industry-year
specic dummies and REG is region-year specic dummies. In the baseline model, I
estimate equation (6) using ordinary least squares (OLS) on the panel with standard
errors clustered by rm and assume that all the correlated heterogeneity is captured by
the rm-specic xed e¤ects and control variables.
3 Data and Institutional Background
The empirical analysis is based on Danish rm-level data. Denmark o¤ers an ideal envi-
ronment to study the impact of ICT on rms demand for skills because of the institutional
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settings of the Danish labor market and its excellent micro data. The Danish labor market
is characterized by what is commonly described as "exicurity" - low employment protec-
tion, large active labor-market programs, and high levels of social insurance and transfers.
This has led to turnover rates and average tenures in line with those of the Anglo-Saxon
countries (Nicoletti et. al., 2000; OECD, 2002). However, there are important di¤erences
with respect to institutions and wage formation. The Danish labor market is heavily
unionized, and the wage structure is relatively compressed, even for continental European
standards (OECD, 2002). The Danish labor market thus shares some characteristics with
other continental European labor markets and others with Anglo-Saxon labor markets.
At the same time, Denmark has experienced large increases in ICT investments in re-
cent decades, similar to those of the Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g., Severgnini, 2009). The
results presented below may therefore also have implications for several other countries.
To test my hypothesis, I use a very rich panel of Danish rms that runs from 2002
to 2008. The data set combines matched employer-employee data - the so-called FIDA
database - with ICT Expenditure Questionnaire Surveys, all administered and maintained
by Statistics Denmark. For each rm, the data set contains complete information on
workersskill characteristics, value added, total capital stock and various subcomponents
of total ICT expenditures. In addition, the data set contains a set of rm characteristics,
such as rm size, industry and union density. I describe the data sources and the main
variables in greater detail below.
3.1 The FIDA Database
The FIDA database is a matched employer-employee panel data set covering the entire
population of rms and individuals in Denmark over the years 1995-2008. Each individual
and each rm is associated with a unique identication code, and most importantly, all
employed individuals are linked with a rm through the rm identication code at the
end of the year. The individual level variables are extracted from the integrated database
of labor market research (IDA database) and the Danish income registry in Statistics
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Denmark. For more details on the IDA database, see Abowd and Kramarz (1999). For
each individual, I have complete data on educational attainment and wages along with
detailed information on other socioeconomic characteristics on an annual basis. The FIDA
database also provides information on value added and the capital stock measured by the
value of xed assets on a rms balance sheet.
3.1.1 Measuring Skills
To measure the skill-level of the workforce, I divide workers into two skill groups based
on their formal level of education: low-skilled labor and high-skilled labor. The Danish
educational system consists of a vocational track and an academic track. Vocational
education is a mix of schooling and training in rms with a typical duration of three
years and also includes workers with a short academic education. Academic education
includes workers with medium academic education, corresponding to a bachelors-level
degree, and workers with high academic education, corresponding to a masters-level
degree or more. For the present purpose, I dene high-skilled labor as those workers with
medium or high academic education, whereas low-skilled labor is dened as those with
vocational education or no education. This denition of skill groups is very similar to the
college/non-college grouping of skill groups used in many previous studies (e.g., Krusell
et al. 2000).
3.2 The ICT Expenditure Questionnaire Survey
The ICT Expenditure Questionnaire Survey has been collected annually by Statistics
Denmark since 2003 and covers a proportional stratied random sample of about 3,000
private Danish rms with at least 10 employees in each year. The sample is stratied
by employment size (number of employees) and industry, and the average response rate
is 95 percent. I have access to the survey from 2003 to 2008. These data are originally
collected to form the ICT investment series in the Danish National Accounts. For this
reason, Statistics Denmark performs extensive quality checks on these data, which ensures
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high levels of accuracy. Moreover, although the survey is not specically designed as a
longitudinal survey, its broad coverage makes it possible to identify many rms that have
participated in the survey more than once over this six-year period.
The survey is targeted at managers responsible for a rms ICT investments and simply
asks how their rms total ICT expenditures are distributed across various subcomponents
of ICT, measured in prices. These subcomponents include: hardware (computers, screens,
keyboards, printers, and scanners), communication equipment (network equipment, ca-
bling, phones, faxes, antennas), audio-visual equipment (televisions, DVDs, projectors,
cameras), other IT-equipment (measuring instruments, apparatus for research purposes),
standard software (software-packages, operative systems, word processing, spreadsheets),
custom software (customized software, ordered and bought by the rm), IT-service (con-
sultancy, webhosting, maintenance contracts) and IT-training (external IT-training). To
ensure that the respondents ll out the questionnaire correctly, it contains detailed in-
structions, including a description of what is meant by each subcomponent of ICT. Fur-
thermore, if the respondent does not know the exact value of the rms investment in a
specic ICT component, they are asked to report their best estimate. Although the re-
ported expenditures are thus not always completely accurate, there is no reason to believe
a priori that these reporting errors should lead to any systematic bias both within and
between di¤erent ICT components.
3.2.1 Measuring IT and CT
My hypothesis makes a sharp distinction between IT and CT. I argue that ITs are tech-
nologies that improve access to information, while CTs are technologies that ease com-
munication. Ideally, I should therefore distinguish between technologies that only either
improves information access or eases communication. In reality, however, this is not a
straightforward task, as some technological innovations may both improve information
access and ease communication. Hence, to make the distinction as simple and trans-
parent as possible, I therefore chose to measure CT as simply communication equipment,
while IT consists of all the other subcomponents (hardware, audio-visual equipment, other
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IT-equipment, standard software, custom software, IT-service and IT-training).
Admittedly, some of these subcomponents can be expected to both improve access to
information and ease communication. In particular, it is obvious that hardware serves
both functions. However, since the price of hardware is mainly determined by its capacity
to store and process information, it seems prima facie reasonable to expect that the net
e¤ect of hardware on skill demand is positive. As a robustness check, I investigate whether
this is actually the case.
Although they are not perfect, these measures of IT and CT seem to capture the main
idea of my hypothesis. Moreover, since the hypothesis implies that the coe¢ cient of IT
is positive and the coe¢ cient of CT is negative, both coe¢ cients would be biased toward
zero if the applied measures of IT and CT consist of subcomponents that both improve
information access and ease communication. As a result, it would make it harder to reject
the hypothesis that IT leads to skill upgrading and CT leads to skill downgrading.
To measure the change in the capital stocks of IT and CT, I use IT and CT expen-
ditures as a share of value added, IT expit
Yit
and CT expit
Yit
.4 As shown by Griliches (1973)
and Terleckyj (1980), this simple approach provides a good approximation of the actual
change in the stock of new technologies between period t  1 and t.5 Figure 3 depicts the
evolution of these two measures during the period I consider. It is seen that IT expen-
ditures as a share of value added has gradually increased over this period, while the CT
expenditures as a share of value added has been fairly stable. This pattern is consistent
with the idea that the fall in IT-prices relative to CT-prices creates a stronger incentive
to invest in IT relative to CT, as suggested above.
4Machin and Van Reenen (1998) use a similar approach to measure change in the stock of R&D
capital.
5Alternatively, I could have constructed IT and CT capital stocks from IT and CT expenditures using
the perpetual inventory method. However, due to, among other things, the shortness of my panel, this
method would most likely generate very imprecise estimates of the IT and CT capital stocks.
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3.3 Sampling and Desriptive Statistics
I construct the analysis dataset by matching the FIDA database over the years 2002-
2008 with the ICT Expenditure Surveys from 2003 to 2008 through the unique rm
identication code. Starting with a sample of 18,051 observations and 9,961 rms, I
exclude rms that could not be matched through the unique rm identication code, those
who do not employ workers in both skill group, and those who do not have observations
in at least two consecutive years in the FIDA database. While the second restriction is
made to avoid a corner solution, the latter exclusion restriction is made to measure all
variables in changes, as IT and CT are already measured in changes. These exclusions
leave us with a sample that consists of an unbalanced panel of 12,523 observations and
6,434 rms that covers ve industries (manufacturing, construction, trade, transportation
and service). Although the sample only represents about 10 percent of all rms with more
than 10 employees in these ve industries each year, it represents about half of both total
employment and total turnover. The sample is therefore not completely representative
of the population of rms in these ve industries, as large rms are highly oversampled.
However, because larger rms tend to invest more in ICT per employee (e.g., Astebro
2002; Hubbard 2000)6, this sample may be particularly interesting to study.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main estimation sample. The mean number
of employees for a rm in the sample is 230, and four out of ve of these employees are
members of a union. Most interesting for the purpose of this paper is that both the
wage-bill and the employment share of high-skilled labor have increased, implying that
skill-upgrading has taken place during this period. Moreover, IT represents about 5
percent of value added, while IT represents less than 1 percent of value added.
6The most common reasons for this relationship are economics of scale, slack resources, access to
outside resources, and ability to bear adoption risks (Forman and Goldfarb 2006).
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4 Empirical Results
In this section, I present the results of my estimations. Section 4.1 contains the main
results. Section 4.2 considers a number of robustness checks. Section 4.3 presents some
results on the magnitudes of the e¤ects.
4.1 Main Results
The model is specied in rst-di¤erenced form, which implies that the parameters are
identied using only variation in the explanatory variables within rms over time. Hence,
the hypothesis is not that rms with the highest level of IT (CT) has the highest (lowest)
skill-level of their workforce but rather that within a given rm an increase in IT (CT)
will cause a change towards an increase (decrease) in the skill-level of their workforce.
Table 2 reports the results of the baseline model. In column 1, I estimate the model
including only industry-year and region-year dummies. The coe¢ cient on IT is positive
and statistically signicant although only at the 10 percent level, while the coe¢ cient on
CT is negative and signicant at the 5 percent level. These results are consistent with my
hypothesis that IT leads to skill-upgrading and CT leads to skill-downgrading. Turning to
other variables, it is seen that the value added has a negative e¤ect on the relative demand
for high-skilled labor. The coe¢ cient of non-ICT is negative but insignicant, suggesting
that there is no evidence of non-ICT capital-skill complementarity. Many studies have
found evidence of capital-skill complementarity using aggregate capital (e.g., Griliches
1969, Krusell 2000), but those studies that distinguish between ICT and non-ICT capital
typically nd that the e¤ect of non-ICT capital is insignicant (e.g., Michaels, Natraj and
Van Reenen 2010).
Column 2 replicates column 1 with a full set of covariates in addition to the industry-
year and region-year dummies. These include rm size (number of employees), union
density (share of workers with union membership), and export intensity (export as a
share of value added). Again, the coe¢ cient on IT is positive, and the coe¢ cient on
CT is negative. Both are still signicant. Moreover, the estimates of the coe¢ cients of
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interest are virtually una¤ected by the inclusion of this set of rm characteristics. Because
controlling for observed heterogeneity has little impact on the estimates, one can be more
condent that unobserved heterogeneity is unlikely to be driving the results.
The specication in equation (6) does not tell us whether the results obtained in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 are driven by changes in quantities, factor prices or both. To
try to distinguish between these two channels, I replace the wage-bill share of high-skilled
labor with the employment share of high-skilled labor in equation (6). These results are
reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. Changes in IT and CT again have the same
opposite e¤ects on the relative demand for high-skilled labor as in column 1 and 2. In
addition, the estimates in column 4 conrm that these results are robust to the inclusion
of additional covariates. However, the coe¢ cients on IT and CT are smaller in magnitude
than those obtained using the wage-bill share, and both are insignicant. Although not
conclusive because the distinct impact of wages has not been analyzed, this seems to
suggest that changes in skill demand are being driving by both changes in wages and
employment.
4.2 Robustness and Extensions
The results above suggest that IT leads to skill-upgrading and CT leads to skill-downgrading.
There are many issues and extensions that follows from these results. In this section, I
investigate some of them in further detail.
4.2.1 Alternative Specication and Samples
First, I replicate the baseline specication in column 2 of Table 2, but restrict the sample
to those rms who have participated in the survey more than once. The objective of this
specication is to assess whether the results I obtained for the full estimation sample are
not simply being driving by those rms that only have participated in the survey once.
The results of this exercise are reported in column 1 of Table 3. Again, the coe¢ cient
of IT is positive, and the coe¢ cient of CT is negative. However, the point estimates are
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larger in magnitude and even more signicant than those obtained in column 2 of Table 2,
although they are slightly less precisely estimated due to reduced sample size. By further
restricting the sample to those rms that have participated in the survey in at least two
consecutive years, column 2 of Table 3 reveals that the coe¢ cients of IT and CT are
similar in magnitude to those obtained column 1 of Table 3.
Second, IT and CT are likely to be endogenous. As an initial attempt to try to deal
with this problem, I estimate the model using lagged values of IT and CT. The usual
argument for using lagged values is that although current values of IT and CT might
be endogenous to skill demand, past values might not su¤er from this problem to the
same degree. In column 3, I use one-year lagged values of IT and CT, and in column 4,
I use two-year lagged values of IT and CT. The coe¢ cients of IT and CT from both of
these specications take their expected signs and are signicant. These ndings conrm
my hypothesis. However, it is unlikely that using one-year and two-year lagged values
of IT and CT solves the endogeneity problem, especially if IT and CT capital stocks are
persistent over time. Below, I therefore try to deal with endogeneity employing an IV
approach.
Third, a concern may be that the results in Table 2 are solely driven by the particular
data I use in this paper. To shed some light on this issue, I test whether I obtain results
that are similar to the existing literature using only aggregate ICT. As can be seen from
column 5 of Table 3, the estimated coe¢ cient of ICT is positive and signicant at the 5
percent level, implying that aggregate ICT increases the relative demand for skills. These
results are in line with previous studies and suggest that the results in this paper do
not reect only a particular feature of the applied data or Danish rms. It also stresses
the importance of distinguishing between IT and CT when testing the technology-skill
complementarity hypothesis.
Fourth, there is the treatment of hardware. As argued above, although hardware
both improves information access and eases communication, the net e¤ect of hardware
on the relative demand for skills is likely to be positive because the price of hardware is
mainly determined by its capacity to store and process information. However, this may be
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contentious. To check whether this is the case, I reestimate the model where ICT capital
is divided into hardware and non-hardware ICT. Column 6 shows that the coe¢ cient of
hardware is positive and signicant, although it is less precisely estimated than the e¤ect
of aggregate IT obtained in Table 2. It thus seems that the overall impact of hardware
on skill demand is positive. Moreover, the e¤ect of non-hardware ICT is insignicant.
4.2.2 Endogeneity and Measurement Error
As mentioned already, an obvious criticism of the results presented above is that there
may be unobservables in equation (6) that are correlated with both the dependent variable
and the capital stocks of IT and CT, which will bias the estimates. However, it is not
obvious a priori that the results presented above are driven by endogeneity biases because
although IT and CT are strongly positively correlated with each other in the data7, their
predicted e¤ects on the same dependent variable take opposite signs. For endogeneity to
generate these results, it would require that the hypothetical unobservable variable that
is positively correlated with the dependent variable has a positive covariance with IT and
a negative covariance with CT. This is of course possible, but it is unclear what would
generate this bias. Another concern is that the right-hand-side variables of equation (6),
especially IT and CT, are plagued with measurement error, causing attenuation bias in
the estimates.
To deal with these concerns, I invoke an IV strategy using industry-level measures of
IT and CT as instruments for rm-level IT and CT. For each rm, these instruments are
calculated as the mean value of (IT exp./value added) and (CT exp./value added) in the
same industry as the rm, excluding the rms own values of (IT exp/value added) and
(CT exp/value added). These calculations are based on all the rms in the surveys. The
idea behind this set of instruments is that di¤erential falls in the quality-adjusted prices
of IT and CT have di¤erent impacts on rmsadoption of IT and CT because the degree
to which rms are reliant on IT and CT in their production process varies considerably.
7In the main estimation sample, the pair wise (Pearson) correlation between (IT exp./Y) and (CT
exp./Y) is 0.79 and signicant at the 1 percent level.
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These instruments proxy this reliance.
The results of the IV estimations are reported in Table 4. In all specications, the
signs of the instruments in the rst stage are as expected (not reported). Furthermore,
the instruments are "strong" because they pass the threshold value of the Cragg-Donald
statistics of 7.03, as suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005).
In column 1, I estimate the model for the full sample. It is seen that the two-stage least
squares (2SLS) estimates of IT and CT have the expected sign and both are signicant at
the 1 percent level. Moreover, the point estimates are substantially larger in magnitude
than their OLS counterparts reported in column 2 of Table 2. The standard errors are,
however, also considerably larger than those obtained using OLS, which is often the price
to pay when using instruments.
Column 2 of Table 4 replicates column 1 using only the sample of rms that have
participated in the survey more than once. Again, it is seen that the 2SLS estimates are
much larger than their OLS counterparts, although the point estimate of IT is smaller
than in the previous 2SLS regression.
In column 3, I restrict the sample to those rms that have participated in the survey
in at least two consecutive years. The 2SLS estimates are still much larger than their OLS
counterparts. Finally, column 4 presents the 2SLS results where I use the instruments
lagged one-year. It is seen that the results are similar to those obtained using the con-
temporary instruments. 8 Taken together, these ndings conrm the hypothesis that ITs
increase the relative demand for skills, while CTs reduce the relative demand for high-
skilled labor. Furthermore, these results are consistent with the presence of measurement
error and suggest that I probably underestimate the importance of IT and CT by using
only OLS.
8I have also estimated the model using GMM and LIML. These estimators produce similar results.
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4.3 Magnitudes
Having established that both IT and CT have statistically signicant e¤ects on skill
demand that are consistent with my hypothesis, I now evaluate the economic importance
of these e¤ects. To do so, I calculate the following formula:
(7) ContributionV = [^V it mean(4Vit=Yit)]=mean(44SHit)
where V denotes IT and CT expenditures, respectively. Taking the di¤erence of the di¤er-
ence means that equation (7) can only be calculated for those rms that have participated
in the survey in at least two consecutive years.
Table 5 reports these results. Using OLS estimates column 1 shows that IT accounts
for 4.2 percent and CT accounts for -1.0 percent of the increase in the wage-bill share of
high-skilled labor. Therefore, IT and CT together explain only 3.2 percent of the variation
in the wage-bill share of high-skilled labor during the period 2002-2008. As argued above,
however, OLS estimates are likely to underestimate the importance of IT and CT because
of measurement error in IT and CT. Turning attention to the 2SLS results in column 2,
we observe a dramatic change. IT now accounts for 24.3 percent of the growth in the skill
demand, while CT accounts for -13.6 of this growth. Thus, IT and CT now explain more
than 10 percent of the observed variation in the skill demand. This marked di¤erence
in the estimated contributions simply reects that the IV estimates of IT and CT are
considerably larger than their OLS counterparts.
These simple calculations should only be considered as suggestive. However, due to
measurement error and the fact that value added growth is likely to be strongly a¤ected by
IT and CT growth (e.g., Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh 2008), these calculations will probably
underestimate the importance of IT and CT. It thus seems that both IT and CT are
important in explaining a signicant proportion of the increased demand for high-skilled
labor.
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5 Conclusion
Existing empirical studies on the skill content of technological changes assumes that all
types of ICT have the same e¤ect on skill demand. In this paper, I propose the alternative
hypothesis that IT complements skills, while CT substitutes for skills. Through improved
access to information, IT will tend to increase the skill requirements of workers, as they
have to handle more information and solve more of the problems they face without relying
on others. Conversely, by facilitating communication, CT will tend to reduce the skill
requirements of workers, as workers can then specialize further and rely more on others
when solving problems.
Using a novel panel of Danish rms, I conrm this hypothesis. I document that
increases in IT increase the relative demand for high-skilled labor, while increases in CT
reduce the relative demand for high-skilled labor. I also show that the demand for skills
is driven by changes in both employment and wages. Moreover, I show that these e¤ects
are non-trivial: IT accounts for about 24 percent of the change in skill demand, while CT
accounts for about -14 percent. I thus conclude that IT and CT are indeed heterogeneous
technologies in relation to skill demand. Moreover, the analysis suggests that failing to
account for the di¤erential impacts of IT and CT can potentially be a serious error.
Although I view this analysis as useful rst step given the lack of evidence of this
issue, there are many extensions in this line of research that could be pursued. First,
additional empirical work analyzing natural experiments and/or using longer panels is
needed to more carefully identify the causal e¤ects of IT and CT on skill demand. Second,
although I provide some evidence that suggests a more nuanced version of the ICT-induced
polarization hypothesis, it would be a useful extension to consider occupational data
to more precisely identify the relationship between that hypothesis and my hypothesis.
Finally, an important area for future research is to study the distinct e¤ects of di¤erent
types of ICT on not only skill demand but also productivity, rm organization and wage
inequality. Studies by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006 and 2010) and Bloom et al.
(2010) have already made contributions in this area.
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1 Introduction
The notion that education is a key determinant of individual productivity has a long and dis-
tinguished history in economics, going back (at least) to the work of Mincer (1958), Houthakker
(1959) and Miller (1960). At the conceptual level one may distinguish between three dimensions
of a formal education which hold the potential to a¤ect individual productivity: The quantity of
education, the quality of education, and the subject matter studied.
While the quantity of education can be measured by years of schooling, the quality of education
is harder to account for. Still, one may attempt to gauge the impact from quality by adding
reasonable proxies to otherwise standard wage regressions, such as test score results. Alternatively,
one may try to infer the impact from quality by including characteristics of the school attended
in earnings regressions (e.g. pupil/teacher ratios and school size). As is well known, standard
theories would predict a positive impact from both of these dimensions of education on individual
productivity (Becker, 1967), as well as on macroeconomic outcomes (e.g. Lucas, 1988). This
proposition has been tested (and debated) intensely over the years.1
The third dimension of human capital accumulation, which has received considerably less at-
tention by academic researchers, is what we focus on in the present study. The issue is whether
the particular eld of study, or the contents of the curriculum, has a separate impact on individual
productivity. Existing studies, surveyed below, suggests this is the case. A typical nding is that
the labor market pay-o¤ from pursuing an education within the humanities is substantially smaller
than that associated with most other types of education. For example, ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates for Denmark, reported below, suggests that the wage rate earned by individuals with a
tertiary education within the humanities is 23% lower than that associated with other tertiary
degrees.2
1See Card (1999, 2001) for a review of the literature which attempts to estimate the causal impact from an
additional year of schooling on individual wages; Card and Krueger (1996) review the literature on the impact from
school quality on labor market outcomes at the level of the individual. Bills and Klenow (2000) provide an analysis
of the education/growth nexus at the aggregate level; Hendricks (2002) examines the contribution from quality
di¤erences in human capital in accounting for cross-country wage di¤erences.
2We refer to the groups under consideration as having obtained a tertiaryeducation. Note that all individuals
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These ndings could suggest that some types of education provide the individual with more
productive human capital than others. At the same time, large wage premia across di¤erent elds
of study are somewhat puzzling. If wage di¤erentials (of a considerable magnitude) appear one
would a priori expect changes in the distribution of students across elds of study; a process that
would continue (in theory) until wages are equalized.
An alternative explanation for the above mentioned ndings is that existing OLS estimates
are not identifying the impact of di¤erent types of education on wages. Instead, the results may
be attributed to a lack of control for di¤erences in relative cognitive abilities, or, comparative
advantages in intellectual pursuits. It seems plausible that comparative intellectual advantages
matter when the individual chooses which type of education to pursue. That is, a relatively math-
ematically skilled student may be more partial to pursue an education where mathematics is used
intensively, compared to a gifted student with comparative advantages in verbal abilities. Moreover,
some types of ability do seem to yield a higher labor market pay-o¤ than others. For example,
Dougherty (2003) nds that numeracy has a strong positive impact on individual wages, whereas
literacy has a much smaller (and often insignicant) impact.3 Accordingly, if relative cognitive
abilities determine the type of education, the individual pursues and a¤ects the nal wage, existing
return estimates to the type of education may be biased.
The Danish educational system is well suited for studying the returns to di¤erent types of
education. The reason is that university degrees in Denmark are highly specialized. For example, if
one chooses to study economics then this is the subject matter pursued throughout the entire time
at the university; both during the undergraduate and the graduate level. Intellectual excursions
into other elds only occur to a very modest extent, in contrast to what may be the case under
e.g. a US-type system. Consequently, examining the labor market performance of Danes holding
in our sample below have attained a masters degree. Hence, the number of years of schooling for all individuals in
our sample is rather homogenous.
3See also Bishop (1992) and Joensen and Nielsen (2009) who nd that greater skills in mathematics goes along
with higher individual level wages. Interestingly, similar results are obtained in the aggregate data. Hanushek and
Woessmann (2009) document that the link between average test scores in mathematics and science is more strongly
related to aggregate growth than test scores in reading; when all three types of test scores are included in the regression
the latter turns insignicant.
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di¤erent types of tertiary education is likely to convey information about the extent of human
capital production within di¤erent elds of study. In addition, Danish universities are publicly
funded which reduces the scope for marked quality di¤erences.
Accordingly, the present paper contributes to the literature by attempting to elicit information
about the causal e¤ect of the eld of study on individual productivity, as it manifests itself in
individual wages. The data set underlying the empirical analysis covers the part of the Danish
population which completed high school during the period 1981-1990.4 Narrowing the focus to
the group of individuals which subsequently proceeded to a tertiary education, and ended up in
wage-employment, we examine whether wage rates di¤er systematically across previous eld of
study. Specically, we examine the relative labor market performance of individuals who chose to
study within the broad elds of human arts and other types of tertiary educations.5 Conditional
on standard determinants of wages an OLS regression reveals that individuals who pursued an
education within the human arts fared much worse, as noted above, than individuals with other
majors.
Still, OLS estimates are unlikely to capture the causal e¤ect of the type of education on individ-
ual productivity, unless relative cognitive abilities are controlled for. Accordingly, we subsequently
try to control for comparative intellectual advantages by invoking individual-level information about
academic specialization in the Danish high school system. In addition, we are able to utilize infor-
mation about the high school attended and high school GPA, as well as data on parental education.
Upon including such controls in the wage equation, the wage gab between human arts majors and
other majors narrows. Still, a signicant di¤erence persist; the wage di¤erence between human arts
majors and others is now 17% (reduced from 23%).
Ultimately it is hard to rule out that other unobserved factors could simultaneously impact
4When we refer to the Danish high school in this paper, we mean the ordinary high school ("gymnasium"). The
Danish high school takes three years to complete.
5We have also attempted to examine a ner division of studies. Unfortunately, we have not be able to disentangle
the returns to education in this more disaggregated setting; our instrument turns out to be weak in this setting. A
possible interpretation is that we need a description of relative abilities in more dimensions than the two dimensional
verbalversus mathematicalability division that we apply here.
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on the choice of education type as well as productivity. As a result, we try to make additional
headway by employing an instrumental variables (IV) approach to the issue at hand.
To identify the impact of the eld of study on wages, we begin by studying the educational choice
itself. That is, the choice of which type of tertiary education to pursue. Specically, we model the
choice of eld of study as a function of (relative) academic abilities, and variables thought to capture
the observed academic tastes of the individualshigh school peer group. While the former turns
out to be linked to nal wages, the latter determinants should not a¤ect the productivity of the
individual, once we carefully control for high school xed e¤ects (perhaps reecting variation in
teacher quality etc.), the curriculum studied by the individual in high school and the academic
achievements of the individual when graduating from high school. As a consequence, peer group
characteristics may serve as instruments for the individualschoice of eld of study.
As documented below, student choices are indeed interdependent. Specically, we nd that
there is a high correlation between the ultimate education choices of seniors and the ultimate edu-
cational choice of the two years younger freshmen. There is a good reason why the interdependence
should appear between seniors and rst year students (rather than between seniors and second year
students) during the period we study. This is the institutional setup of the Danish High-School
system before 1990, which is discussed below.
We interpret these ndings as reecting the inuence from student interaction about the attrac-
tiveness of various elds of study. That is, it reects the consequences of informational updating.
The type of information conveyed is unlikely to be about labor market earnings; raw labor market
earnings are relatively easy to observe. However, it is considerably harder to assess the broader
quality-of-lifepay-o¤ to a specic education. For instance, what is the associated status, work
environment and so forth? We hypothesize that student interaction serves to convey this kind of
information. In addition, we conjecture that students with (revealed or hypothesized) preferences
for particular elds of study likely hold an informational advantage within their preferred area.
Accordingly, if an individual is more exposed to a peer group with preferences for the human arts,
the more likely it will be that new information about the quality-of-lifeaspects of a working life
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with a human arts degree is brought forward. This new information may a¤ect the educational
choice.6
In sum, we argue that the high school specic fraction of seniors choosing an education within
the human arts, is a viable instrument for the choice of which type of tertiary education individuals
pursue. With this instrument in hand, we proceed to estimate the impact of choosing an education
in the humanities using an IV-Probit model.
Our IV point estimates di¤er substantially from the conventional OLS counterparts. After
instrumenting the wage di¤erence between human arts majors and other majors is reduced to
0.3% and in fact slightly positive, but insignicant. Thus, we nd no signicant di¤erence in the
impact from the education choice on wages. Hence, we are led to the following conclusions: Relative
cognitive abilities seem to have a substantial impact on wages, and comparative intellectual abilities
do seem to matter for the choice of which education to pursue. However, it seems that the impact
from the education per se on wages only depends on the eld of study to a very limited extent.
Naturally, one may question our identication strategy. In particular, one could argue that the
rst stage correlation between the educational choices of di¤erent high school specic groups is
simply picking up (unobserved) school quality in various dimensions. Since such quality di¤erences
may inuence productivity and wages this reasoning would suggest that our instruments are invalid.
We believe that such concerns are unlikely in the present case for a number of reasons. First,
Danish high schools are (generally) publicly funded, from a regional source. Hence, the type of local
neighborhood e¤ects, known to be operative in e.g. the US, whereby high income municipalities
can provide better funding for educational facilities, are not operative in Denmark. Second, all
Danish high schools follow the same curriculum, and all students attend the same (centrally devised)
written exams. Third, in our analysis we are able to control for the identity of the high school, the
individual have attended. If a specic high school happens to deliver high quality teaching in some
particular eld, a high school xed e¤ect picks it up. Finally, we show that the correlation between
6Note that since the hypothesis emphasizes information updating, it does not follow that more information about
(say) the humanities necessarily will increase the probability that one would choose an education within this eld of
study. Section 6 contains a more detailed discussion of this issue.
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the educational choice of a particular cohort and its contemporaries in their high school exhibit
an age e¤ect. For instance, there is no correlation between the ultimate educational choice of a
given cohort and the ultimate educational choice of a one year younger cohort, a one year older
cohort, or a four years older cohort. But there is an association between the ultimate educational
choice of a cohort and the ultimate educational choice of a two and a three years older cohort. This
general pattern is hard to explain away by appealing to high school specic (quality) e¤ects. At
the same time, it is consistent with peer e¤ects running from older students to younger students,
as explained below.
Another (and somewhat related) threat to the causal interpretation of the IV estimates is that
our instrument is simply capturing student self-selection into high schools and, thus, systematic
(unobserved) student ability variation across high schools. To evaluate this concern, we restrict
our sample to students that i) live in the municipality where the high school is located and ii) live
in municipalities with no more than one high school. We obtain ndings that are very similar to
those obtained with the full sample, implying that self-selection into high schools are unlikely to
be responsible for our ndings.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the existing literature
which estimates the return to di¤erent types of education. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy
and section 4 describes the data and provides some institutional background on the Danish edu-
cational system. Section 5 presents the baseline OLS results. Section 6 presents the identication
strategy and the IV results, while section 7 discusses potential threats to identication. Section 8
concludes.
2 Related Literature
While the literature on the return to schooling is vast, only a relatively limited number of studies
have attempted to come to grips with the return to type of education.
James et al (1989) is the earliest contribution which provides evidence of di¤erences in hu-
man capital remuneration by eld of study. Specically, they add dummy variables to an annual
59
earnings equation capturing college majors. Their sample includes earnings and various individual
specic characteristics (including the college attended) of 1241 males, drawn from the National
longitudinal study of the high school class of 1972 (NLS72). They nd very large di¤erences in
the return to college major. For instance, a student who chose his major in the humanities,
instead of engineering, should expect 45% lower annual earnings in 1985, ceteris paribus; a truly
remarkable return di¤erence. Indeed, as James et al. concludes (p. 251): [...] while sending your
child to Harvard appears to be a good investment, sending him to your local state university to
major in Engineering, to take lots of math, and preferably to attain a high GPA, is an even better
investment. On a priori grounds, however, their estimates may not reect a causal impact on
productivity for two reasons. First, their labor market data concerns annual earnings. As a result,
some of the observed di¤erence may be attributed to di¤erences in number of hours worked in
di¤erent occupations. Second, the choice of major is treated as exogenous.7
Blundell et al. (2000) draw on the UK National Child Development Survey, which contain
data on family background of children born in 1958 (between March 3 and 9), their educational
choice (including the subject studied) along with labor market data on hourly wages. The wage is
observed for the year 1991, when the subjects were 33 years old. In contrast to previous studies,
Blundell et al. (2000) also attempt to deal with the endogeniety problem by invoking matching
methods to identify the impact from higher education on hourly wages. Specically, individuals
with a higher education were compared with individuals who could have taken a degree (based on
previous educational performance) but chose not to, while sharing various observable characteristics
(like ability, family background etc.).8 In line with previous studies, Blundell et al. also detect
7Daymont and Andrisani (1984) also contain information about elds of study; but their focus is on showing that
the gender gap in wage regressions shrink, once the choice of major is accounted for. Other studies that investigates
earnings di¤erential across majors include Dolton and Makepeace (1990), Grogger and Eide (1995) and Loury and
Garman (1995). A common feature of these studies is that they also (in contrast to the present study) treat the
choice of type of education as exogenous.
8This approach is similar to the OLS wage regressions reported below; like the National Child Development Survey
our data contain very rich socio-economic background information of the individuals pursuing a higher education,
which we control for along side more standard variables like work experience etc. Naturally, this only resolves the
endogeniety problem if all relevant individual specic characteristics are controlled for. If unobservable characteristics
matter for wages and choice of education the estimates remain biased.
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di¤erences in labor market rewards across elds of study. For example, chemistry and biology
exhibits the lowest return, whereas economics, accountancy and law the highest. In many cases,
however, the e¤ects from educational type are not very precisely estimated, presumably because of
a rather limited sample size.
Bratti and Mancini (2003) also examine data from the UK. Like Blundell et al. (2000) they
invoke matching methods. In addition, they also consider the problem that selection may take
place over unobservable variables. In ensuring identication they rely on a multinomial-logit-OLS
(MLO) set up, where choice of education is estimated and then the impact of education type
on wages. As in the present paper they invoke an IV methodology. In Bratti and Mancini the
exclusion restriction is that choices made in previous education (specically: A-level curriculum)
and the age of the student does not matter for wages directly, controlling for type of degree and
standard Mincer-type controls. While their OLS results suggest that graduates from economics
and business subject did better than the rest, their MLO results lead to no clear-cut ranking of
subjects; the pecking order appears to change over time. One may argue, however, that their data
is not optimal. The reason is that the data source (University Statistical Research data) does not
include information about salaries. Since the authors do have access to fairly detailed information
about occupation, they can construct salaries for individuals. This is done by using data from the
New Earnings Survey; individuals salaries are computed as (p. 9) the average gross weekly pay
of individuals employed full time (in the same occupation) in the year following the questioner.
Hence, by construction there is no within-occupation variation in earnings in their sample. As a
result, their results are likely to speak to the impact from the type of education on occupations,
rather than on wages per se; potentially valuable information pertaining to di¤erences in wages
across individuals with di¤erent educational backgrounds in similar occupations cannot be used for
the purpose of identication.
Finally, Arcidiacono (2004) examine the return to college major, by modelling the educational
decision explicitly. Arcidiacono, like James et al. (1989), rely in the NLS72 data set, implying the
return estimates speak to earnings, rather than wages per se. The study documents that selection is
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indeed taking place. Moreover, controlling for selection, Arcidiacono still nds considerable return
di¤erences across majors; as in James et al. students majoring in e.g. the natural sciences fare
better in the labor market.
3 Empirical Strategy
In estimating the relative return to eld of study we specify a wage equation that includes the
individuals choice of educational type. The wage earned by individual i is denoted by yi. Si
measures the education type (major in human arts or other types) chosen by individual i and is the
binary endogenous variable of interest. Si equals one for having a masters degree within human
arts and zero otherwise; the return estimate of human arts is therefore relative to other majors.
This indicator is used because we restrict our self to include tertiary educations of about equal
duration, and because the Danish educational system is such that one specializes in one topic only
at the university.
Our wage regression is
log(yi) = +   Si + xi + di;c + di;t + di;s + ui: (1)
The parameter  captures the relative return on a degree within the humanities; it is the key
parameter of interest. The vector xi consists of observed background variables to be described
below; this set includes standard controls in wage regressions. The variables di;j j = c; t; s are
various xed e¤ects which we introduce to try to control for ability; both the absolute level and the
relative level. We expect these xed e¤ects to a¤ect wages, and the choice of educational type, Si.
The xed e¤ects are di;c for high school curriculum, which should capture the individuals own
assessment of the costs of acquiring specic skill types. We describe this variable in greater detail
below. The variable di;t controls for time e¤ects. More precisely, this is the year of graduation from
high school. Finally, di;s is included to control for the attended high school and thereby potential
quality di¤erences in skills formation.
Ultimately we will treat Si  the indicators for educational type  as endogenous. In order
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              
              

              
               
                
               
               
             
               
             
               
                  
          
 
                 
             
            
             
  
             
          
             
              
         

              
                

              
               
                 
                
                 
               
                  
                
               
                    
             
 
                 
              
                
             
  
             
           
             
               
          

4.1 Sampling of Data
In our main estimation sample we focus on individuals that satisfy the following two criteria: (i)
graduated from high school between 1981 and 1990 and proceeded to obtain a masters degree
and (ii) was wage-employed in 2000; in the main regressions below we use the wage rate in 2000
as dependent variable. These exclusions leave us with a main estimation sample that consists of
29,700 individuals.
We conne attention to high school graduates from the period 1981-1990 since this period was
characterized by a particularly useful institutional setting, which allows us to proxy comparative
intellectual abilities. After 1990 the high school system changes. We describe the nature of the
institutional setting in some detail below.
Using 2000 as the base yearis a choice made for practical reasons. The last high school cohort
in our sample graduated in 1990. In Denmark it is not uncommon for students to take a sabbatical
before beginning their university studies. Moreover, few students manage to complete their studies
within the prescribed period of usually ve years. Hence, in order to include all cohorts in the
sample 2000 is a reasonable starting point.
To even out potential yearly uctuations in wages, we also use the average wage over the period
1999-2001 as dependent variable. After all, the null is that the choice of education matters to
permanent income; averaging should increase the signal-to-noise in the dependent variable. Still,
using time averages is not critical to the results, which is documented by using alternative denitions
of the dependent variable and samples.
4.2 Explanatory Variables
4.2.1 High School Information
Figure 1 show graphically how a student proceeded through the Danish educational system, from
lower secondary school to tertiary education, during the period 1981-1990. Individuals usually enter
the Danish high school immediately after completing lower secondary school, and graduates after
three years.
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When applying to a high school for admission, the student was required to specify an over-all
track to follow: mathematicalor language. After completing the rst year, students then self-
selected into various branches, available for each track, as illustrated in Figure 1. Under the math
track students could choose between math/physics, math/natural sciences, math/social sciences,
or math/music, while under the languages track students could choose between languages/social
sciences, languages/music, modern languages, or classical languages.9 Hence, individuals were
grouped into eight distinct branches. During this institutional arrangement the curriculum was
determined after strictly dened course packages, implying that knowing the track and branch
provide fairly precise information about the curriculum, the students completed.
<Figure 1 around here>
The information about which branch the individual pursued in high school appear in (1) and
(2) as the curriculum xed e¤ect (i.e., di;c) to control for relative cognitive abilities directly. Hence,
the basic idea is that the choice of branchprovides information about the individual students
relative abilities; a math/social science major was likely not quite as mathematically inclined as
a math-physics student; at least the level of math taught was objectively speaking higher in the
math/physics branch compared to the math/social science branch.
The branch based systemwas in place until 1990; from 1991 onwards students were given
much greater autonomy with regards to course packages. Hence, the reason why we only sample
high school graduates up until 1990 is precisely because it marks the end of the branch based
system.
Eventually we do not have to rely on being able to fully control for relative ability, since we pur-
sue an IV approach. However, as will be seen: branch choices hold considerable explanatory power
vis-a-vis post university wages, suggesting that relative abilities across subjects indeed matter.
In order to control for absolute ability, we use the grade point average (GPA), which enters
9 In the last years of the sample a few experimental branches was allowed; e.g., Math/English and Math/Chemestry.
Only very few students pursued these branches; they are excluded from our sample.
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into xi. The GPA is a weighted average of the grades at the nal exam at each course. The quality
of the courses as well as the GPA is comparable across high schools since all students within the
same cohort face identical written exams; all exams and major written assignments are evaluated
by the students own teacher as well as external examiners; high school teachers from other high
schools. The external examiners are assigned by the Danish Ministry of Education.
Completed high school is a general admission requirement for tertiary educations, as suggested
by Figure 1. We have information on which high schools individuals attended (149 in total). This
information enters as the high school xed e¤ect, (i.e., di;s) and serve as controls for high school
quality. Moreover, we have information on year of graduation from high school, which enters as the
graduation year xed e¤ect, i.e., di;t. This dummy captures information on experience in equation
(1).
4.2.2 Tertiary Education
As mentioned above, we focus exclusively on individuals who ultimately obtain a masters degree.
The reason is that we want to avoid any selection bias in our results due to the choice of educa-
tion length. Moreover, we partition the type of tertiary education into two bins: human arts vs
others.10 This information enters in the regressions as individual choice of education type, i.e.,
in Si.
4.2.3 Other Explanatory Variables
We also apply individual information not related to high school attendance as explanatory variables,
i.e., variables that enter in xi. These are gender and parental education. Gender is included to
control for the gender wage gap in (1), whereas it enters (2) to control for gender di¤erences in
relative abilities or preferences.11 Parental education is controlled for by including a set of indicators
10 In Denmark, a tertiary education in humanities includes the following main disciplines: ancient and modern
languages, literature, history, philosophy, religion and visual and performing arts. Academic disciplines such as
psychology, anthropology, cultural studies and communication are considered as social sciences.
11There is evidence to suggest a gender bias in the context of educational choice. In an inuential study, Benbow
and Stanley (1980) examined nearly 10,000 mathematically gifted boys and girls at the ages of 12 to 14. Their
main empirical nding was a signicant gender di¤erence in mathematical reasoning in favor of boys as measured
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for each parent regarding both the length and type of their education.
Table 1 displays selective descriptive statistics for the samples. The sampling unit is the in-
dividual, and the table presents the distribution on type of tertiary education, the distribution of
students on high school branches, their high school grade point average, and their gender.
<Table 1 around here>
Some aspects of the data are worth remarking on. Almost 5/6 chose the math track in high
school, while only 1/6 chose the language track; the largest high school branch is math/physics.
Recall, these statistics are all conditional on progressing to a tertiary education and being wage
employed for an unbroken period of three years. As regards subsequent choice of education type,
other educational types attract the most students compared to human arts that attract 10.5% of
the students. Moreover, almost 60% consist of men. The high school GPA is 8.8, which is above
average as expected.12
5 Baseline OLS results
In Table 2, we report the results from the standard wage regression. That is, the endogeneity
problem is ignored.
<Table 2 around here>
To recapitulate: These regressions are performed for persons with a tertiary education, who are
wage-employed in 2000. In column 1 of Table 2, only indicators of the choice of education type are
by the SAT-M. This observed di¤erence could not be ascribed to di¤erential course-taking accounts. Moreover,
20 years later Benbow et al. (2000) revisited the sample and studied the educational and career outcomes of the
students; they document a signicant di¤erence in education choices, with boys (now around 33) more likely to have
chosen an education within the natural sciences; girls were more likely to pursue an education within the humanities.
Admittedly, it seems hard to assess whether (and to what extend) these ndings have a geneticor cultural origin.
But either way it would appear that women are more partial to the humanities, compared to men. We detect a
similar pattern below.
12A numerical grading system is used in Denmark. The possible grades were at the time: 0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
and 13; 6 were the lowest passing grade, and 8 were given for the average performance.
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included in order to study the raw wage di¤erences between human art majors and other majors.
The rawwage gaps reveal that human arts graduates have 23% (exp[-0.2580]-1) lower wages than
other graduates.
In columns 2-5 of Table 2, more information is gradually introduced into the log wage regression
to study how the estimated wage di¤erence changes. In column 2, we introduce a gender dummy
in the regression that enters negatively and signicantly with a parameter corresponding to women
earning an average wage that is about 15% lower than the average wage for men. In column 3,
we introduce high school GPA and nd that the average wage increases by around 2% per grade
point. Column 4 includes curriculum xed e¤ect or the choice of high school branch that proxies
for relative talent. It is evident that those who studied at the math/physics branch in high school
earned the highest wages compared to any other branch. A high school curriculum in classical
languages or language/music led to the lowest wages that on average were about 11% lower than
that of math/physics. In general, those who chose the language track tend to earn lower wages than
those that chose the math track. This suggests that mathematical abilities are valued more in the
labor market than linguistic abilities. Finally, column 5 includes all above mentioned explanatory
variables. In addition, we also include dummies for graduation year from high school, information
for education length and type of parents and high school xed e¤ects. High school xed e¤ects
come in addition to, for example, the e¤ect of parental education and may comprise, e.g., teacher
quality etc.
Over-all, when control variables are progressively added we observe that the relative di¤erence
in returns across elds of study shrinks from -23% to -17%, but remains statistically (as well as
economically) signicant.
6 Identication and IV estimates
As already mentioned, an obvious criticism of the results presented above is that there may be
unobserved factors that are correlated with both the choice of education type and wages, which
will bias the OLS estimates. To deal with this concern, we employ an IV strategy based on the idea
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that individualseducational choice is inuenced by that of older students in their high school. This
section proceeds in three steps. First, we provide a simple theoretical argument which motivates
our identication strategy. Next, we explain how our instrument is constructed. Finally, we discuss
our baseline IV results.
6.1 The logic of the IV strategy: Theory
Consider an individual who is to decide which type of education to pursue. The individual derive
utility from wage income, y, and quality of lifemore broadly, q. The latter variable is thought
to capture, in a parsimonious way, factors such as status, work environment and job satisfaction
associated with being employed using education of type i = H(uman arts); O(ther). Without loss
we assume that wage income is observable, whereas q is something individuals hold expectations
about. Utility is separable in the two arguments (y; q), and the expected level of utility for an
individual (the index of whom is suppressed in the interest of brevity) is therefore
E [U (y; q)] = u (y) +
Z
v (q) f (q) dq;
where f () is the density function for q.13
We assume f () supports a given variance 2 and mean ; both may be specic to either
type of education:
 
i; 
2
i

; i = H;O: Importantly, both 2i and i are thought to reect the
individuals perception of the moments of the distribution of q: We treat both as known with
subjective certainty in the derivations below, but both may vary from one individual to the next.
In this sense we capture, in a simple way, di¤erences in the information set of individuals at the
time of optimization. Accordingly, these are the parameters which may be inuenced by student-
to-student interaction.
The felicity functions u () and v () exhibit positive and diminishing marginal utility: uy > 0;
13See e.g. Fershtman et al. (1996) for an analysis of the allocation of talent in a society where individuals derive
utility from consumption and social status. In the present case, however, we dene qmore broadly to include other
aspects of nal employment that individuals may value like work environment and job satisfaction.
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uyy < 0; vq > 0; vqq < 0. If we Taylor approximate v around the mean, , we obtain
v (q) ' v () + vq () (q   ) + vqq ()
2
(q   )2 :
Evaluating expected utility we obtain, after some rearrangements, a simple representation of the
preferences, which depends on income, expected quality of life and the variance of the latter14
E [U (y; q)]  u (y) + v () + vqq ()
2
2:
Now, suppose an individual with these preferences are to choose between two alternative types
of education: H and O. Realistically, the individual undoubtedly will have di¤erent aptitude
to the two forms of education. That is, di¤erent relative ability levels, which manifests itself
in di¤erent wages. To capture this we may dene the levels of income in nal occupation as
yH  y (H) ; and yO  y (O) :15 The parameter i captures ability, and we expect the relative
level of ability (H=O) to di¤er across individuals, reecting variation in comparative cognitive
ability. Hence, some students may have a comparative cognitive advantage in the humanities,
implying H > O ) yH > yO: For others, of course, it may be the other way round. The
pertinent characteristic of i is that it is predetermined at the time of optimization; it may have
been determined earlier in life, or simply at birth.
Next, one may suppose the perceived mean and variance of q in the two potential endeavours
of life di¤er. For simplicity, suppose only the latter di¤ers. If so the individual will prefer H to O
i¤
u ([y (H)]) +
vqq ()
2
2H > u [y (O)] +
vqq ()
2
2O:
Hence, individuals with high ability in H will be more likely to choose this type of education. How-
14See the Appendix for derivations.
15Of course, we could easily admit wages to be a¤ected explicitly by years of schooling etc. Say, by assuming
yi = ie
iui , where i is the (potentially) eld-specic return to a year of (eld specic) education, ui: Similarly, at
the cost of some more notation, we could allow both dimensions of ability (H ; O) to a¤ect wages in either form of
occupation; say yi = eiui
i
i . In general, then, we would allow the return to these abilities to di¤er; H 6= O.
Finally, we abstract from absoluteability. This too could be introduced, perhaps dened as an average of the two
components (H ; O) :
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ever, greater uncertainty with respect to q (i.e., 2H) may persuade the individual to do otherwise.
Accordingly, uncertainty about the non-pecuniary consequences of the educational choice may
impact on what the individual decides, as a consequence of risk aversion. We hypothesize that
some of the uncertainty may be resolved by interacting with fellow students. In particular, if the
individual is exposed to students with information about q, this will lower 2.
Naturally, the interaction could a¤ect perceived  as well. As a consequence of these multiple
channels of inuence, the net impact on the inequality from more information is ambiguous.
For instance, if the result of the interaction is simply to lower 2H (say) then interaction should
make it more likely that the individual chooses H. Alternatively, suppose the student-to-student
interaction reveal information about . Naturally, if the information update implies 0H > H (with
0H being the revised mean), it should also make it more likely that the individuals chooses H. But
if 0H < H , the converse is true.
The key point, however, is that neither  nor 2 matters to wages, y; they only a¤ect the
educational choice. Accordingly, factors that lead to changes in
 
i; 
2
i

may be useful in identifying
the impact of the educational choice itself. We hypothesize that student-to-student interaction, and
thus the characteristics of the individualspeer group, may serve this purpose.
6.2 Constructing the Instrument
Our identication strategy is based on the idea that co-students inuence the information set on
which the individual base his or her nal choice of a tertiary education. We do not doubt that
individuals own abilities and interest are central. However, it would seem plausible that fellow
students inuence the individualschoice of education. This inuence can take many subtle forms,
including providing students with a sense of what a certain type of education implies in terms of job
satisfaction given the individuals ability and interest. Such information could a¤ect the individuals
expectations about the consequences of obtaining an education.
More concretely, we apply a measure of older students educational choice at the high-school
as an instrument for the educational choice of younger students. The instrument is constructed as
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follows: First, shares of individuals with tertiary education in humanities out of the total number
of individuals with a tertiary education are constructed; the shares are determined for the group
of individuals within the same high school and high school track. This implies that, two shares
are calculated for each high-school per graduation year; one for the math track and one for the
language track.16
Second, the shares are lagged two years, to capture the inuence from seniors on freshmen. It is
important to stress that seniors and freshmen (in Denmark they are two years apart) are not paired
up arbitrarily. During the period we study students were to choose their academic specialization
in high school after the rst year.17 It seems plausible that high school specialization could give
rise to a tendency to academic path dependence; early specialization a¤ecting the ultimate form of
specialization. Hence, if fellow students were to have a particularly strong impact on individuals
choice of ultimate tertiary education, a major inuence would be possible after one year of high
school studies. This is the hypothesis we examine in the next section.
Before turning to the IV results, Table 3 presents summary statistics for the shares of students
choosing human arts lagged two years. It is seen that the mean share of individuals with a tertiary
education in humanities equals 0.22. The variable varies considerable from 0 for the 5 and 10
percentiles to about 2/3 for the 95 percentile. As described above, the variable is measured by high
school, high school track, and graduation year, resulting in 2,252 clusters for the main sample of
29,700 individuals.18
<Table 3 around here>
16We calculate the instrument for each high school track separately because students had to choose track upon
entry to high school.
17See Section 4.2.1.
18The main reason that there are only 2,252 clusters in the main sample (and not 2,980) is that not all of the 149
high schools exist over the entire period 1981-1990.
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6.3 Baseline IV estimates
In this section, we present the IV results for the relative di¤erence in returns across elds of study.
The main specication applies the wage rate in 2000 as dependent variable and the squared value
of the share of individuals graduating in human arts as instrument. We apply the latter variable
as the main instrument because it implies the most clear-cut results, see the discussion below.
Table 4 reports our main IV results; the upper panel shows the second stage of the 2SLS
regression, whereas the lower panel displays the results from the probit model: the probability
model of the choice of education type. The results are estimated using clustering that allows for
dependence in residuals within clusters.
<Table 4 around here>
Starting with the latter, the variable of particular interest is that from which we obtain identi-
cation: The square of the share of students two cohorts ago choosing human arts. As is clear from
column 1 of Table 4, there is a statistically strong positive inuence from the ultimate educational
choice of the two years older cohort. This e¤ect emerges despite the fact that we simultaneously
control for gender, high school GPA, parental education, high school branch xed e¤ects, gradua-
tion year dummys and high school xed e¤ects. Moreover, the instrument is signicant and the
2-test is about 14, suggesting that our instrument is not weak (Staiger and Stock, 1997).
Turning attention to the 2SLS estimate for the ultimate educational results, we observe a
dramatic change: The point estimate is numerically very close to zero and in fact slightly positive,
but is insignicant. This can be compared to the OLS results reported in column 5 of Table 2,
where we found that a human arts education was associated with about 17% lower wages that other
types of education.
As a result, we are led to the conclusion that the relative wage pattern observed in the (raw) data
is primarily caused by selection into education types based on observed and especially unobserved
relative ability. The fact that human arts majors earn much lower wages than the average acad-
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emic employee is caused by the composition of their ability endowments and the returns to these
endowments in the labor market rather than their eld of study. Simply put, human arts majors
are particularly negatively selected in terms of the market values of their ability endowments.
The standard error of the point estimate increases from 0.0060 to 0.0439; that is the standard
error of the 2SLS is about 7 times larger than the OLS standard errors. In other words, the point
estimate of the 2SLS regression is less precisely estimated than the point estimate of the OLS
regression in Table 2. However, as is well-known, larger condence intervals is a price we must pay
to get a consistent estimate on the relative returns to education. It should be emphasized that the
magnitude of the increase in standard errors is in line with those usually found in the literature on
returns to schooling, see e.g. Angrist and Krueger (1991), Card (2001), and Fersterer, Pischke and
Winter-Ebmer (2008). Finally, the endogeneity test of the indicator for educational type equals
19,518, which implies that the null hypothesis  that the indicator for educational type can be
treated as exogenous can be rejected at the 1% signicance level.
In column 2-3, two additional regressions are presented. The results in column 2 are based
on the average wage rate over the years 1999-2001 for the sample of 23,434 individuals that were
employed in wage work during the three year period 1999-2001. It is seen that the stage two results
are similar to those obtained in the main regression in column 1: The return to human arts majors
and other majors are fairly similar. The probit regressions in column 1 and 2 are almost identical.
Finally, column 3 presents the IV results where the two-year lagged share of individuals grad-
uating in human arts enters as instrument directly; not as the squared value. It is seen that the
qualitative results of column 1 is supported, i.e., the instrument enters positively and signicantly,
and the point estimate of the 2SLS is numerically close to zero. We prefer the specication pre-
sented in column 1 and thereby the squared value of the share of individuals educated in human
arts as instrument because the 2-test from the probit model is higher in this specication.
74
7 Threats to Identication
Having established from our baseline IV estimates that the observed wage gab between human arts
majors and other majors is primarily caused by selection into elds of study based on especially
unobserved comparative advantages, we now examine two threats to identication: unobserved
high school quality and self-selection into high schools.
7.1 Does the instrument capture high school quality?
Although we control for high school xed e¤ects, one may reasonably question whether our instru-
ment is really capturing peer e¤ects. An alternative interpretation could be that it captures some
unobserved quality aspects of individual high schools.
For instance, it might well be the case that some schools have a stronger faculty in human arts
courses than others, for which reason a larger fraction of a cohort eventually chooses human arts
as their tertiary education. This is a dimension of high school quality that is not captured by high
school xed e¤ects. If this constitutes a persistent e¤ect (and it likely would be, of course), we
would expect that the unobserved quality e¤ects shows up as a (spurious) cross-cohort correlation
in the ultimate educational choice. Worse, the underlying quality e¤ects might inuence wages
directly, thereby rendering the instrument invalid.
Observe, however, that this interpretation of the probit ndings in Table 4 suggest a time-
invariant cross-cohort correlation. If what we are picking up is a quality xed e¤ect, we would
expect to see that the partial correlation is relatively una¤ected if we instead employed (say) the
fraction of the students in a younger cohort, that eventually chooses human arts. But that is not
what we nd.
Figure 2 depicts the changes in the partial correlation between cohorts educational choice, when
we modify the lag structure; the lag 2entry reproduces the result from Table 4. The interesting
nding is that the partial correlation displays a distinct pattern. The correlation with younger
cohorts (lead) is essentially nil. There is a positive correlation when we examine the educational
choices of the one year older cohort (lag 1), however, the e¤ect is insignicant. The maximal
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e¤ect is found when considering a two year older cohort (i.e., the educational choice of seniors).
Lagging further leads to a gradually diminishing correlation; where a three year older cohort has a
positive and signicant e¤ect, and a four year older cohort has a positive but insignicant e¤ect.
<Figure 2 around here>
This pattern is no mystery if we consider the institutional setting, as described in Section 4.2.1.
After the rst year, recall, freshmen were to choose their area of specialization. Hence, this is the
time where a potential inuence from older students should be at its peak, which is consistent
with the pattern depicted in Figure 2. The fact that there is a correlation with the three year
older cohort is probably attributable to indirect e¤ects. That is, the two year older students were
a¤ected by students that were older than them; an e¤ect which might - partially - trickle down
across the generations of students. It is seen that this e¤ect is weakened the more lags we add. This
explanation is reinforced by the fact that the correlation with the three year older cohort becomes
insignicant when we estimate the probit model including only "lag 2" and "lag 3" (not reported).
Hence, while this pattern is consistent with the proposed hypothesis - involving cross-cohort
informational spillovers - it is hard to explain by quality e¤ects. We view this check as a strong
indication that our instrument is not picking up some unobserved high school specic quality e¤ect.
7.2 Self-Selection
Another (somewhat related) concern is that the student body of high schools with graduates that
proceed to study human arts might be systematically di¤erent form high schools where this is
not the case. That is, perhaps our instrument is simply capturing student self-selection and thus
systematic (unobserved) student ability variation across high schools.
It is important to understand the scope for such selection e¤ects. Danish high school students
would, as a rule, apply for a high school in their local municipality. Still, there were exceptions to
this rule. Hence, self-selection e¤ects could be at work in two instances: (i) in the (non conventional)
situation where the student managed to get accepted to a high school in a neighbouring municipality,
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(ii) in situations were there are more than one high school to choose from in the local municipality.
Table 5
In Table 5, we therefore examine our IV results for the following sub-samples of the base sample:
In column (1), we require that students live in the municipality where the high school is located. In
column (2), we apply the sample of column 1 and restrict it further to require that there is one and
only one high schools in the municipality. Moreover, students that live in municipalities without
high schools are included, while students that live in Copenhagen are excluded.
Students that live in municipalities without high schools are included in the sample of column
2 of Table 5. The reason is that the samples would otherwise be cut too drastically. Of course,
the students belonging to this group have the opportunity to self-select them into high schools
of their preferred choices. To limit the extent of self-selection, students attending high schools in
the Copenhagen area are excluded, which might be a specialarea for a number of reasons, but
especially because the range of alternative high schools, the individual students could select among
is particular large.
Hence, in column 1 we are dealing with a group of students that did not apply to  or did
not manage to get accepted into a high school in a neighbouring municipality. In column 2, we
are trying to limit situations were there are more than one high school to choose from in the local
municipality. We are not able to handle this in a perfect manner, since the restrictions that we
prefer results in a sample of 6,000 students only.19 This is why we include students that live in
municipalities without high schools. We expect that this group of students to a large extend only
have one high-school the nearest to apply to, especially when students outside the Copenhagen
area are considered.
The point estimates from these specications with alternative samples, columns 1-2 of Table 5,
are quite similar to that in the base sample, although the sample size has been reduced by up to
19The restrictions for this sample are: (i) students attended high school in the municipality where they live and
(ii) municipalities with one high school only.
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50% of the base sample. The estimated return from a tertiary degree in human arts is about the
same. This suggests self-selection into high schools is unlikely to be invalidating our identication
strategy.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the e¢ ciency of human capital production across di¤erent types of
education by exploiting Danish register data. If some elds of study are more e¢ cient in producing
human capital, this should manifest itself in a superior labor market performance of its graduates.
Baseline OLS regressions reveal that students of human arts fare the worst in the Danish labor
market with an hourly wage rate about 20% below that of graduates within other majors.
One may suspect, however, that the partial correlation between the type of education and
wages does not convey accurate information about human capital production. If the selection into
educational types is non-random, the OLS estimates will be biased. Our analysis conrms that
selection seems to be at work. Socioeconomic circumstances, absolute ability, as well as relative
cognitive abilities, measured by high school course work, inuence the choice of education type.
Consequently, we invoke instruments for education type to address the selection problem. Our
instrument is based on the inuence from other students on individualschoice of education type.
Strikingly, once education type is instrumented, we nd no statistically signicant di¤erence in
the wage gab between human arts majors and other majors. This result suggests that a tertiary
degree in humanities do not provide individuals with signicantly less productive human capital
than other types of tertiary education. Accordingly, the relatively poor wage performance of human
arts majors in the Danish labor market is mainly due to selection according to relative cognitive
ability, rather than to low human capital production at universities.
The present analysis raises new questions worth exploring in future research. First, wage dif-
ferences seem to be related to relative cognitive abilities; mathematics appears to be important,
for example. But why is that? Is it because such abilities are relatively scarce in the population or
because they are particularly productive? If the latter is the case, then it would be useful to try
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and discern why such abilities are in high demand. Further motivation for pursuing this question
is found at the macro level where test scores in math and natural sciences seem to be a stronger
linear predictor of aggregate growth than test scores for reading (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2009).
Second, how are relative abilities in, e.g., math and human science formed? As they determine
both educational choices and wages, it would be useful to know whether these cognitive traits have
a genetic origin, or are acquired during primary and secondary schooling. If the former is the
case, education policies cannot be invoked to inuence them; and conversely if relative talents are
acquired.
79
References
[1] Angrist, J. and A. Kruger, 1991. Does Compulsory School Attendance A¤ect Schooling and
Earnings? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 979-1014.
[2] Arcidiacono, P., 2004. Ability sorting and the returns to college major. Journal of Economet-
rics, 121, Issues 1-2, 343-375.
[3] Becker, G., 1967 : Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income. Ann Arbor Michi-
gan: University of Michigan Press.
[4] Benbow, C.P., D. Lubinski, D.L. Shea, and H. Eftekhari-Sanjani, 2000. Sex Di¤erences in
Mathematical Reasoning Ability at Age 13: Their Status 20 years later. Psychological Science,
11, 474-480
[5] Benbow, C.P. and J.C. Stanley, 1980. Sex Di¤erences in Mathematical Ability: Fact or Arti-
fact?, Science, 210, 1262-1264
[6] Bishop, J. H., 1992. The impact of academic competencies on wages, unemployment, and job
performance. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 37, 127194.
[7] Blundell., R., LL. Dearden, A. Goodman. and H. Reed, 2000. The Returns to Higher Education
in Britain: Evidence from a British Cohort. Economic Journal, 110, 82-89.
[8] Bills M. and P. Klenow, 2000. Does Schooling Cause Growth? American Economic Review,
90. 1160-82
[9] Bratti M. and L. Mancini, 2003. Di¤erences in Early Occupational Earnings of UK Male
Graduates by Degree Subject: Evidence from the 1980-1993 USR. IZA Discussion Paper No.
890
[10] Card, D., 1999. The Causal E¤ect of Education on Earnings. In Handbook of Labor Economics,
Ashenfelder, O. and D. Card (eds), Vol. 3, Ch. 30. Elsevier.
80
[11] Card, D., 2001. Estimating the return to schooling: progress on some persistent econometric
problems. Econometrica, 69, 1127-60.
[12] Card, D. and A. Krueger, 1996. Labor Market E¤ects of School Quality: Theory and Evidence.
NBER working paper 5450.
[13] Daymont, T. and P. Andrisani, 1984. Job preferences, college major, and the gender gap in
earnings. Journal of Human Resources, 19, 408428.
[14] Dolton, P. J. and G.H. Makepeace, 1990. The Earnings of Economic Graduates. Economic
Journal, 100, 237-250.
[15] Dougherty, C., 2003. Numeracy, literacy and earnings: evidence from the National Longitudi-
nal Survey of Youth. Economics of Education Review, 22, 511-521
[16] Fershtman, C., K. Murphy and Y. Weiss, 1996. Social Status, Education, and Growth. Journal
of Political Economy, 104, 108-132
[17] Fersterer, J., J.-S. Pischke and R. Winter-Ebmer, 2008. The Returns to Apprenticeship Train-
ing in Austria: Evidence from Failed Firms. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104, 733-753
[18] Grogger, J., and E. Eide, 1995. Changes in college skills and the rise in the college wage
premium. Journal of Human Resources, 30, 280310.
[19] Hanushek, E. and L. Woessmann, 2009. Do better schools lead to more growth? Cognitive
skills, economic outcomes and causation. NBER working paper no. 14633.
[20] Hendricks, L., 2002. How Important Is Human Capital for Development? Evidence from
Immigrant Earnings. American Economic Review, 92, 198-219.
[21] Houthakker, H.S., 1959. Education and Income. Review of Economics and Statistics, 41, 24-28.
[22] James, E., A. Nabeel, J. Conaty and D. To, 1989. College quality and future earnings: where
should you send your child to college?. American Economic Review, 79, 247252.
81
[23] Joensen J. and H.S. Nielsen, 2009. Is there a Causal E¤ect of High School Math on Labor
Market Outcomes? Journal of Human Resources, 44, 171-198.
[24] Loury, L. and D. Garman, 1995. College selectivity and earnings. Journal of Labor Economics,
13, 289308.
[25] Lucas, R. Jr., 1988. On the Mechanics of Economic Development. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 22, 3-42.
[26] Mincer, J., 1958. Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution. Journal of
Political Economy, 66, 281-302
[27] Miller, H.P., 1960. Annual and Life Time Income in Relation to Education. American Economic
Review, 50, 962-86.
[28] Staiger, D. and J.H. Stock, 1997. Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments
Econometrica 65, 557-586.
[29] Wooldridge, J. M., 2002: Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, The MIT Press.
82
A Deriving Expected Utility
The second order Taylor approximation
v (q)  v () + vq () (q   ) + vqq ()
2
(q   )2
Observe that (q   )2 = q2 + 2   2q: Hence
v (q) ' v () + vq () (q   ) + vqq ()
2
q2 +
vqq ()
2
2   qvqq ()
Inserted into the utility function we obtain
E [U (y; q)]  u (y) + v () + vq ()
Z
qf (q) dq   vq ()
+
vqq ()
2
Z
q2f (q) dq +
vqq ()
2
2   vqq ()
Z
qf (q) dq:
A useful result regarding means and variances is that
R
q2f (q) dq = 2 + 2: Using it in the
expression above we get
E [U (y; q)]  u (y) + v () + vqq ()
2
2
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Abstract
This paper presents evidence on taxable income responses using administrative data
that link tax return information to detailed socioeconomic information for the entire Danish
population over 25 years. The identifying variation is provided by a series of tax reforms
that create large tax variation across individuals, income forms, and over time. It is argued
that the unique tax variation and data in Denmark makes it possible to control for the biases
from non-tax changes in the income distribution and mean reversion that plague much of
the existing literature. Our main ndings are the following: (i) Labor income elasticities
are modest overall, around 0.05 for wage earners and 0.10 for self-employed individuals. (ii)
Capital income elasticities are about 2-3 times larger than labor income elasticities. (iii)
Behavioral elasticities are much larger when estimated from large tax reform episodes than
for small tax reform episodes, consistent with idea that responses to small tax changes are
attenuated by optimization frictions such as adjustment costs and inattention. (iv) Cross-
tax e¤ects between labor and capital income for example due to income shifting are in
general small. (v) All of our ndings are extremely robust to specication (such as pre-reform
income controls), suggesting that we have controlled in a su¢ ciently rich way for non-tax
factors impacting on taxable income.
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1 Introduction
The recent literature on behavioral responses to taxation has shifted its focus from the elasticity
of hours worked to the elasticity of reported taxable income. E¤ects on taxable income capture
the full range of responses to taxation, including hours worked, unobserved e¤ort, training,
occupational choice, tax avoidance and tax evasion, and therefore provides a more complete
picture of the behavioral response to taxation. Moreover, as argued by Feldstein (1995, 1999)
in two inuential papers, the elasticity of taxable income provides a su¢ cient statistic for the
revenue and e¢ ciency e¤ect of income taxation, which places this parameter at the centre stage
of all the major normative questions in public nance such as the structure of optimal income
redistribution and the size of government.
A large and growing literature estimates the elasticity of taxable income using tax return
data. Most of this work is based on the United States and uses as its source of identication a
series of tax reforms in the 1980s and 1990s that were associated with substantial tax changes
at the top of the income distribution (e.g. Feldstein 1995; Auten and Carroll 1999; Mo¢ tt and
Wilhelm 2000; Goolsbee 2000; Gruber and Saez 2002; Kopczuk 2005; Giertz 2007). In addition
to the U.S. literature, a number of recent studies estimate taxable income responses in other
countries that have lowered marginal tax rates at the top of the income distribution through the
1980s and 1990s, including the United Kingdom under the Thatcher administration (Brewer,
Saez, and Shephard 2010), Canada (Sillamaa and Veall 2001; Saez and Veall 2005), Norway
(Aarbu and Thoresen 2001), and Sweden (e.g. Hansson 2007; Blomquist and Selin 2010; Gelber
2010).1
Reforms that strongly target the top of the income distribution provide interesting variation,
but are also associated with some important empirical di¢ culties. Because the allocation of tax
treatments is determined by pre-reform income level, we have to consider the possibility that
di¤erent income groups di¤er in a number of non-tax dimensions that impact on taxable income
1Alongside the large literature using income tax reforms to estimate taxable income responses, a recent smaller
literature estimates taxable income responses using bunching around kink points created by discrete jumps in the
marginal tax rate in piecewise linear income tax schedules (Saez 2010; Kleven et al. 2010; Chetty et al. 2011).
While bunching around kink points provides a very compelling source of identication in principle, an important
limitation of this strategy is that there tends to be very little bunching in empirical distributions. Only very
sharp and salient kinks create any bunching at all, and even there the response is modest (Chetty et al. 2011).
The likely explanation is the presence of optimization frictions associated with locating exactly at the cuto¤ (such
as adjustment costs, misperception and inattention) combined with the fact that the utility gain of bunching in
response to jumps in marginal tax rates is typically not very large (Chetty 2011).
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and are correlated with the tax law changes. This problem is reinforced by the fact that tax
return data typically contains very little information about tax payers besides income variables
and tax rates, making it di¢ cult to control for any non-tax di¤erences across di¤erent tax payers.
Two specic problems have been discussed extensively in the literature (e.g. Slemrod 1998;
Saez 2004; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2010). First, it is very hard to disentangle tax-driven
increases in top incomes from increases that are driven by non-tax factors such as skill-biased
technical change and globalization. This problem is particularly important in countries that
have experienced strong secular increases in top income shares, and may result in a substantial
upward bias in the elasticity estimates. Second, dening treatments and controls according to
pre-reform income level creates a mean-reversion problem, because a tax payer with a positive
income shock in the pre-reform year will tend to have a lower income in the following years,
independently of the reform. For tax cuts at the top, this biases elasticity estimates downwards.
In order to correct for the two biases mentioned above, the literature has attempted to control in
a number of ways for pre-reform income levels. However, the richness of such income controls is
constrained by the fact that the identication comes from di¤erent tax changes across pre-reform
income levels, and in general the results turn out to be extremely sensitive to specication.
This paper presents new evidence on taxable income responses based on a series of Danish
tax reforms and a very rich administrative dataset covering the entire Danish population over 25
years (1980-2005). The Danish tax context and data holds the promise to avoid the biases dis-
cussed above for the following three reasons. First, by linking tax return data to administrative
data containing detailed socioeconomic information for every taxpayer, we control directly for
some of the underlying non-tax components of permanent and transitory income that are im-
portant for the biases discussed above. Second, the evolution of the Danish income distribution
has been much more stable than in most other countries, even compared to other egalitarian
societies such as Sweden.2 To illustrate this, Figure 1 shows top income shares based on a broad
income measure including all labor income and capital income. As the gure makes clear, top
income shares have been roughly constant over time with the exception of a tiny increase after
the mid-1990s. The unchanging income distribution in Denmark isolates mean-reversion as the
potential bias that must be controlled for.
2Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) provide international overviews of the evolution of top income shares, while
Roine and Waldenström (2008) study the Swedish experience.
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Third, we consider a time period that encompasses a series of tax reforms, which create
large and compelling identifying variation. In some years, the tax variation created by the
Danish reforms is larger than the variation created by the major U.S. reforms of the 1980s,
and importantly the Danish variation does not does not feature the same strong correlation
with income level as the U.S. variation. The Danish reforms were associated with three main
changes: (i) di¤erential changes in marginal tax rates across di¤erent tax brackets, (ii) changes
in bracket cuto¤s that moved large groups of taxpayers to di¤erent brackets, and (iii) a move
from a fully symmetric treatment of di¤erent income components (e.g. labor income vs. capital
income and positive income vs. negative income) to an asymmetric treatment of di¤erent income
components. The combination of points (i) and (ii) create large and nonlinear tax variation
through the income distribution in a way that is not systematically correlated with income level.
Point (iii) implies that income composition, besides income level, plays a key role for the tax
bill, thereby creating variation across individuals at the same income level. All three changes
together therefore create very rich identifying tax variation.
In a tax system based on asymmetric tax treatment of di¤erent income forms, estimating the
elasticity of overall taxable income with respect to the marginal tax rate is not very meaningful
as there is no single well-dened marginal tax rate associated with this income concept. More
importantly, the presence of independent tax variation across di¤erent income forms provides
a rare opportunity to analyze the anatomy of taxable income responses, a question which is
interesting in its own right (Slemrod 1995, 1996, 1998; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2010). To
explore this, we estimate responses for the underlying components of taxable income separately,
and we also consider specications allowing for cross-tax e¤ects between di¤erent income forms.
Our main ndings are the following. First, labor income elasticities are modest seen over the
full time period, around 0.05 for wage earners and 0.10 for self-employed individuals. Second,
capital income elasticities are about 2-3 times larger than labor income elasticities. Third,
behavioral elasticities (both labor and capital) are substantially larger when estimated from
large tax reform episodes than from small tax reform episodes. This nding is consistent with
the argument by Chetty et al. (2011) and Chetty (2011) that elasticities estimated from small
tax changes are attenuated by optimization frictions (e.g. adjustment costs and inattention),
whereas large tax changes are likely to overcome such frictions and hence reveal the true long-run
elasticity. We nd that a particularly large and salient tax reform in the late 1980s is associated
95
with a population-wide elasticity of labor income of about 0.12, whereas a series of smaller
tax reforms in the 1990s and 2000s are associated with a labor income elasticity of only 0.02.
Fourth, cross-tax e¤ects between labor and capital income are in general weak, with a small
degree of complementarity between the two income forms for wage earners and a small degree of
substitutability for self-employed individuals. Since income shifting for tax avoidance purposes
by itself would imply substitutability, our results suggest that income shifting is more prevalent
for the self-employed than for wage earners.
Finally, we show that the above set of ndings is extremely robust to empirical specication,
including the specication of pre-reform income controls. We explore the di¤erent income con-
trols that have been proposed in the literature along with alternative specications that control
in a richer way for mean reversion. The robustness of our ndings is reassuring and suggests that
we have controlled in a su¢ ciently rich way for non-tax factors impacting on taxable income.
Against this background, we argue that the Danish context o¤ers a useful laboratory allowing
for a credible identication of taxable income responses.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Danish tax system and tax reforms
used to estimate behavioral responses, while section 3 describes the data. Section 4 describes
the empirical specication and identication strategy. Section 5 presents the empirical results,
while section 6 concludes.
2 The Danish Tax System and Tax Reforms
The Danish individual income tax system treats di¤erent income forms in a partially separate
fashion, as opposed to standard tax systems that apply a progressive rate structure to a single
measure of taxable income. The income concepts of the Danish income tax system, shown in
Table 1, are given by labor income (LI), personal income (PI = LI + other PI), capital income
exclusive of stock income (CI), stock income (SI), deductions (D), and taxable income (TI = PI
+ CI + SI D). These income concepts are aggregated into several di¤erent tax bases that are
taxed at di¤erent rates. The denition of those bases as well as the associated tax rates have
undergone substantial changes over time due to a series of tax reforms, and this is the variation
that we exploit to estimate behavioral elasticities.
Taxes are divided into national taxes and regional taxes at the municipal and county level,
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but the two types of taxes are enforced and administered in an integrated system. At the national
level, a series of important tax acts have been implemented over the past 25 years. Those tax
acts are the 1987-reform, the 1994-reform, the 1999-reform (called the Pentecost Package),
and the 2004-reform (called the Spring Package). Most of these reforms were phased in over
several years, which generates considerable tax variation in most years of the period we consider.
We also exploit changes in tax schedules at the regional level, but those changes have been much
smaller and are more uniform across taxpayers than the national changes.
Throughout the period we consider, the national income tax has been divided into three
main brackets: a bottom bracket, a middle bracket, and a top bracket. The past 25 years of tax
reform have been associated with three main changes. First, a lowering of marginal tax rates
in each bracket, with larger cuts in the middle and top brackets than in the bottom bracket.
Second, a substantial broadening of the tax base as negative capital income and deductions were
prevented from o¤setting positive income on a one-to-one basis. This change was implemented
by changing the tax schedule from a function of total taxable income (TI) to a function of each
of the underlying income components (LI, PI, CI, SI, D), with a higher marginal tax rate on
labor income than on the other income components as well as a higher marginal tax on positive
income than on negative income (such as mortgage interest and deductions). With the exception
of stock income, the taxation of the di¤erent income components is not fully separate and cross-
e¤ects in the tax function are therefore non-zero. Third, adjustments of bracket cuto¤s that did
not correspond to the base broadening, thereby pushing tax payers into higher brackets. This
bracket push combined with the fact that tax rates were reduced within each bracket imply
substantial and very heterogeneous tax rate variation through the income distribution. All of
the changes together create strong variation across taxpayers at di¤erent income levels, across
tax payers at similar income levels (but di¤erent income compositions), and across di¤erent
income types. Below we describe the tax reforms in greater detail.
Table 2 shows the di¤erent tax rates and associated tax bases in four specic years: 1986
(before the 1987-reform), 1993 (before 1994-reform), 1998 (before the 1999-reform), and 2005
(after the 1999- and 2004-reforms). The tax system consists of a at regional tax (shown for the
average municipality) along with progressive national taxes levied on varying tax bases. The
main national taxes are the bottom tax, the middle tax and the top tax, and in some years
those taxes are supplemented by social security contributions, labor market contributions, and
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an EITC. The di¤erent tax rates shown in the table are cumulative such that a taxpayer in the
top bracket is subject to the sum of the bottom, middle, and top taxes (along with the other at
taxes).3 The table shows the tax base changes mentioned above. In the mid-1980s, all tax rates
applied to overall taxable income, whereas in the 1990s and 2000s no tax rate applies to this
broad income measure. In 2005, for example, tax liability is calculated from four di¤erent tax
bases: taxable income exclusive of stock income (PI + CI D), personal income plus positive
net capital income (PI + [CI > 0]), labor income (LI), and stock income (SI).
There are two points to make with regard to those tax base changes. First, in a situation
where taxable income include subcomponents that are treated di¤erently, it is not meaningful
to estimate an elasticity of overall taxable income with respect to the marginal tax rate as there
exists no single, well-dened marginal tax rate for this income concept. We therefore consider
the underlying income components of the tax system separately, focusing on labor income and
capital income (excluding stock income). We do not consider stock income as it is taxed on a
completely separate schedule, which has remained relatively constant throughout most of the
period and therefore o¤ers less variation than the rest of the income tax code.4 Second, the
type of base broadening described above does not raise the conceptual problems that have been
discussed extensively in the literature on taxable income responses (Slemrod 1998; Kopczuk
2005). The usual problem is that such reforms require us to consider constant-denition tax
bases in order to avoid confounding behavioral and denitional changes, but in so doing we
are relating the tax rate to an articial tax base di¤erent from the one in the tax code in a
given year. However, the base broadening shown in Table 2 does not pose this problem (and
indeed create a lot of interesting variation that we will exploit), because it does not consist in
including previously untaxed components in the tax system. In all years, the tax system depends
on the same underlying income components, and it is instead the aggregation of those income
components into tax bases that changes over time.
3For example, in 1986, a taxpayer in the top bracket would face a marginal tax rate equal to 28.1 + 14.4
+ 14.4 + 10.8 + 5.5 = 73.2%. However, a marginal tax ceiling is in place in all years, and this ceiling equals
73% in 1986 and is therefore binding for a taxpayer living in an average municipality. In 2005, the marginal tax
ceiling has dropped to 59.0% and was indeed also binding for a taxpayer in the top bracket living in the average
municipality. For labor income, there is a labor market contribution of 8% on top of the tax ceiling, but at the
same time labor income enters all the other tax bases net of the labor market contribution. The e¤ective tax
ceiling on labor income in 2005 is therefore equal to 8.0 + (1 0.08)  59.0 = 62.3%.
4The most useful quasi-experimental variation in stock income taxation is created, not by tax reforms, but
by a sharp kink at the cuto¤ between two brackets in the stock income tax. Kleven et al. (2010) use bunching
around this kink to estimate the elasticity of stock income and nd evidence of strong behavioral responses.
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Figure 2 illustrates the implications of the tax rate and tax base changes described above for
the e¤ective marginal tax rates on labor and capital income in each bracket (bottom, middle,
and top) over time. For labor income (Panel A), the marginal tax rate in the top bracket has
been declining from 73% to 62%, while the tax rate in the middle bracket has been declining
from 62% to 49%. On the other hand, the bottom tax rate is increasing over the early part of
the period and then declining over the later part of the period. Overall, the di¤erence between
the bottom tax and the middle/top taxes has been shrinking over this period, although the
relative changes have not been dramatic. However, these graphs do not reveal the important
implications of bracket push as we come back to below.
For capital income, we distinguish between negative capital income (Panel B) and positive
capital income (Panel C) as the two are taxed very di¤erently. For negative capital income,
the three brackets have collapsed into one bracket subject to the bottom tax rate (as negative
capital income was excluded from the middle and top tax bases). For taxpayers in the top
bracket, the marginal tax rate associated with negative capital income has dropped from about
73% to 33% over the period, while for taxpayers at the bottom the drop has been much smaller.
These dramatic tax changes a¤ect a very large number of taxpayers, because capital income is
in fact negative for the majority of Danish taxpayers as a result of interest payments on loans
(mortgage and other loans). For positive capital income, we also see very large changes as the
band between the top and the bottom rst narrows substantially (since all capital income is
excluded from the top tax base) and then widens substantially (since positive capital income is
reintroduced in the top tax base).
Finally, to see the importance of bracket push due to under-adjustment of bracket cuto¤s as
bases were broadened, Panel D shows the evolution over time in the share of taxpayers located
in each bracket. We see that the share of taxpayers liable to pay the top tax has increased
dramatically from less than 10% of the population in the mid-1980s to almost 30% of the
population in the mid-2000s. The share of individuals in the middle bracket has fallen from
about 40% to slightly above 20% over the whole period, while the share of taxpayers in the
bottom bracket falls from about 50% to 40% in the early part of the period and then rises back
to 50% in the latter part of the period.5 These movements across brackets create substantial
5The bottom, middle, and top bracket shares do not quite add up to 1, because a small amount of taxpayers
below a basic exemption level are not liable to pay the bottom tax.
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tax variation, especially for labor income. The combination of the tax rate changes for labor
income in Panel A and the bracket push in Panel D create very strong and heterogeneous tax
variation through the income distribution.
Overall, the reforms described in this section implies substantial tax variation over time and
across individuals. Indeed, as we show in section 4 when discussing the identication strategy,
the variation in some years is comparable to the major tax acts in the U.S. in the 1980s and the
Tax Reform of the Century in Sweden in the early 1990s.
3 Data
The analysis is based on a very rich panel that runs from 1980 to 2005 and covers the entire
universe of Danish tax payers. The data set has been constructed by Statistics Denmark based
on a number of administrative registers, including the Income Tax Register and the Integrated
Database for Labor Market Research (IDA). For each individual, the data set contains detailed
tax return information along with a large set of socioeconomic variables such as place of residence,
gender, age, marital status, number and age of kids, immigrant status, ethnicity, employment
status, job experience, education, occupation, and industry.
Marginal tax rates are not directly observed in tax return data, and we therefore have to
simulate the marginal tax rate for each taxpayer based on tax return information and a model
the Danish tax system. As there exists no publicly available TAXSIM model for Denmark, we
have constructed our own TAXSIM model of the Danish tax system over the period 1984-2005.
Based on this model and tax return data, we compute the marginal tax rate on a given income
component by increasing income by DKK 100 (' USD 20). In particular, if tax liability T (:)
is a function of n di¤erent income components z1; :::; zn, we compute the marginal tax on zj as
 j =

T
 
z1; :::; zj + 100; :::zn
  T  z1; :::; zj ; :::zn) =100.6
Following Gruber and Saez (2002), the empirical strategy is to relate changes in reported
income over time to changes in marginal tax rates over time for individual taxpayers. We focus
on the period 1984-2005 and consider three-year intervals (1984-1987, ..., 2002-2005). We denote
the rst year in any given three-year interval by s and the last year by s + 3. We include only
6While the Danish income tax system is based on individual ling for married couples, it involves certain
elements of jointness due to the fact that some exemptions can be transferred across spouses. This implies that,
for a married person, income tax liability depends on both individual incomes and on spousal incomes. Our
TAXSIM model fully accounts for this jointness.
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tax payers that are also observed in year s 1 and s 2, because we use those years to construct
pre-reform income controls. The three-year di¤erences are stacked to obtain a dataset with
about 49 million observations.
We restrict the sample used for estimation in the following ways. First, we restrict the
sample to individuals aged 15-70 years. Second, we exclude individuals whose income in base
year s comes primarily from welfare benets, because this would require us to account for the
important incentive e¤ects of the welfare system and model extensive responses. Third, we limit
our sample to people who are fully tax liable in Denmark. These restrictions leave us with a
sample of about 37 million observations. Table 3 shows summary statistics for the estimation
sample.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 The Model
The economic model underlying the new tax responsiveness literature is a simple extension of the
traditional labor supply model. It is assumed that each tax payer maximizes a utility function
of the form u (c; z; x), where c is consumption, z is reported taxable income, and x is a vector of
individual characteristics. We may think of reported income z as being generated by a number
of underlying choices such as hours worked, unobserved e¤ort, training, occupational choice, tax
sheltering activities, etc. The implicit assumption in the literature is therefore that all those
underlying activities are weakly separable from consumption in the utility function. Utility is
maximized subject to a budget constraint c = z   T (z) = (1  )  z + y, where T (:) is tax
liability,   T 0 (:) is the marginal tax rate, and y    z   T (z) is virtual income. We may
then write the optimal choice of taxable income as z = z (1   ; y; x).
Consistent with the Danish setting described earlier, we extend the above model to account
for the presence of multiple income types that are taxed di¤erently. Consider therefore a con-
sumer choosing incomes z1; :::; zn under a tax schedule T
 
z1; :::; zn

. This consumer maximizes
utility
u = u
 
c; z1; :::; zn; x

; (1)
subject to a budget constraint
c =
nX
j=1
zj   T  z1; :::; zn = nX
j=1
 
1   j zj + y; (2)
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where  j  @T=@zj is the marginal tax rate on income type zj (which is in general a function
of all the di¤erent incomes z1; :::; zn) and y  Pnj=1  jzj   T  z1; :::; zn is virtual income.
Our measure of virtual income is a generalization of standard virtual income to a situation
with multi-dimensional income. In the case where component zj reects deductions in taxable
income, because z-variables are dened as income in eq. (2), this component would be equal to
minus deductions.
In this model, the optimal choice of any given income type zj depends on all the net-of-tax
prices and virtual income, i.e.
zj = zj
 
1  1; :::; 1  n; y; x : (3)
In general, an empirical specication for a given income type zj should account for both own-
price e¤ects of changes in the marginal net-of-tax rate on income j as well as cross-price e¤ects
of changes in the net-of-tax rates on all the other income types. Indeed, the Danish tax reforms
o¤er a rare opportunity to identify cross-tax e¤ects between di¤erent income forms. In the
empirical analysis, we start by considering baseline specications without cross-tax e¤ects, and
then turn to specications that allow for cross-tax e¤ects. The analysis of cross-tax e¤ects
enables us to evaluate the potential importance of income shifting between labor and capital
income, an issue that has been much discussed in the literature.
In the baseline model without cross-tax e¤ects, expression (3) implies zjis = z
j

1   jis; yis; xis

for tax payer i at time s. Adopting a log-linear specication (as is standard in the literature),
we consider the following specication
log

zjis

= + "  log

1   jis

+   log (yis) + cs  xci + v  xvis + i + is: (4)
In this specication, we distinguish between time-invariant individual characteristics xci whose
e¤ect may change over time and time-variant individual characteristics xvis whose e¤ect is con-
stant over time. The e¤ect of time-invariant individual characteristics whose e¤ect is constant
over time is subsumed in the individual xed e¤ect i. The key variables of interest are the
uncompensated elasticity of reported income (") and the income elasticity ().7
7The specication of the income e¤ect in terms of virtual income (as dened above) is di¤erent from the
specication in several previous studies on taxable income elasticities (e.g. Gruber and Saez 2002; Kopczuk
2005), which species the income e¤ect simply in terms of after-tax income z   T (z).
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In rst-di¤erenced form, the model can be written as
 log

zjis

= "  log

1   jis

+   log (yis) + cs  xci + v xvis +is: (5)
In the baseline specication, di¤erences at time s are three-year di¤erences from s to s+ 3.
4.2 Identication and Relationship to Previous Literature
Because of the nonlinearity of the tax system, the marginal tax rate and virtual income are
endogenous to the choice of taxable income, which creates a correlation between  log

1   js

,
 log (ys), and the error term. The usual way to construct instruments for these variables
is to use mechanical tax changes driven by changes in tax laws. Hence, using the Danish
TAXSIM model described above, we simulate post-reform marginal tax rates under pre-reform
behavior,  js+3
 
z1s ; :::; z
n
s

, where we account for the fact that the marginal tax rate on in-
come j may depend not just on the level of income j but also on the levels of the other in-
comes. From the simulated marginal tax rates, we obtain mechanical net-of-tax rate changes,
log

1   js+3
 
z1s ; :::; z
n
s
   log 1   js  z1s ; :::; zns , which are used as instruments for the ob-
served changes  log

1   js

. Analogously, we simulate post-reform virtual incomes under
pre-reform behavior, ys+3
 
z1s ; :::; z
n
s

=
PN
j=1 
j
s+3
 
z1s ; :::; z
n
s

zjs   Ts+3
 
z1s ; :::; z
n
s

, and associ-
ated mechanical changes in virtual income, log
 
ys+3
 
z1s ; :::; z
n
s
  log  ys  z1s ; :::; zns , which are
used as instruments for the observed changes  log (ys).
While the mechanical tax changes used as instruments are exogenous to post-reform incomes,
they do depend on pre-reform incomes. Hence, the instruments may be correlated with the error
term if the pre-reform income level is correlated with the error term. The literature has discussed
two channels through which this may occur. First, tax payers at di¤erent pre-reform income
levels may experience di¤erent income trends for non-tax reasons. Indeed, many countries
have experienced sharply increasing top income shares over the past few decades, and several
studies have argued that these changes are driven by skill-biased demand shocks resulting from
innovation and globalization. Unless skill can be directly controlled for, it would be captured
by pre-reform income levels and skill-biased changes would then be absorbed in the estimated
elasticity. Second, the pre-reform income level reects both permanent and transitory income
components, which creates a mean-reversion problem: a tax payer with a very high income in
the pre-reform year will tend to have a lower income in the post-reform year, other things being
103
equal. In the absence of controls for transitory income components, they would be captured by
pre-reform income levels and hence be absorbed by the estimated tax e¤ect.
The problems just described are particularly acute when considering tax reforms that are
strongly targeted to certain income groups such as high-income earners (as in the case of the
U.S. tax reforms in the 1980s). In that case, the mechanical tax changes will be strongly
correlated with income level and therefore with skill-dependent demand shocks and transitory
income components. To deal with this problem, Auten and Carroll (1999), Mo¢ tt and Wilhelm
(2000), Gruber and Saez (2002), and Kopczuk (2005) propose to control in di¤erent ways for
pre-reform income. For example, Kopczuk (2005) proposes a specication that includes the
change in income in the year prior to the reform, zs   zs 1, as a proxy for transitory income
components, along with the lagged income level zs 1 as a proxy for the permanent income level.
He allows for nonlinearity by experimenting with 10-piece splines in the logarithms of either of
the two controls. He also explores a number of other specications, including those adopted
by Auten and Carroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002). The results show that the elasticity
estimates are extremely sensitive to the specication of pre-reform income controls.
We consider the various income controls that have been proposed in the earlier studies,
along with specications that control in a richer way for the dynamic income process. The rich
tax variation in Denmark allows us to include additional lags and higher-order splines without
soaking up all the identifying variation. Unlike the previous literature, we nd that our results
are extremely robust to the specication of income controls, suggesting that we have controlled
in a su¢ ciently rich way for non-tax factors impacting on taxable income.
There are three key reasons for the robustness of our ndings. First, because of the large set
of socioeconomic variables in the data, we are able to control directly for a number of non-tax
characteristics driving permanent and transitory income components. For permanent income,
variables on education (level attained and area of study) capture skill level, which controls for
the e¤ect of a changing income distribution due to skill-biased demand shocks. Variables on
gender, marriage, kids, immigration, and ethnicity may further control for permanent income
components. For transitory income, controlling for variables such as place of residence, local
unemployment, age, job experience, occupation, and industry ensure that we are comparing indi-
viduals a¤ected similarly by idiosyncratic labor market conditions, which alleviates the problem
of mean-reversion. Second, as discussed in the introduction and shown in Figure 1, there has
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been no signicant secular change in the income distribution in Denmark, implying that the
bias from unobserved non-tax factors a¤ecting the income distribution is not a big concern here.
This isolates mean-reversion as the potential bias that the income controls have to correct for
(to the extent that the other socioeconomic variables are not su¢ cient). Third and crucially, the
biases discussed above rely on the presence of a correlation between tax changes and pre-reform
income level, which is not an important feature of the Danish reforms. As described earlier,
the Danish reforms were not systematically targeted to certain income groups and created are
lot of up-and-down movements in tax rates throughout the income distribution. In fact, the
increasing asymmetry in the tax treatment of di¤erent income components creates variation
even for taxpayers at the same income level (but with di¤erent income compositions). In the
next section, we demonstrate the exact nature of the Danish variation around specic reform
episodes.
4.3 Mechanical Variation in Marginal Net-of-Tax Rates
To give a precise sense of the identifying variation, Figures 3-5 show the mechanical variation
in marginal net-of-tax rates (i.e., the variation in the instrument) for di¤erent income types
around the two largest reform episodes in our data, the 1987- and 1994-reforms. Each gure
shows three-year di¤erences in percent, where we have split the sample into seven groups using
base-year income variables: (i) individuals who are in the bottom bracket both before and after,
(ii) individuals who are pushed from the middle to the bottom bracket, (iii) individuals who are
pushed from the bottom to the middle bracket, (iv) individuals who are in the middle bracket
both before and after, (v) individuals who are pushed from the top to the middle bracket, (vi)
individuals who are pushed from the middle to the top bracket, and (vii) individuals who are in
the top bracket before and after. It is important that the grouping is based only on base-year
income variables and therefore does not incorporate a behavioral response.
Before considering the tax variation in Figures 3-5, let us briey remark on two aspects of
the gures. First, it is the combination of changes in tax bases and bracket cuto¤s that makes it
possible for a tax reform to push some taxpayers from a lower to a higher bracket (e.g. bottom
to middle) and simultaneously push other taxpayers in the opposite direction (e.g. middle to
bottom). Second, the grouping of taxpayers in the gure is useful to make the identifying
tax changes stand out. The grouping is di¤erent from one based on quantiles of the income
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distribution (for e.g. total taxable income). Such a grouping would show much less average
tax variation in each quantile group as it lumps together tax reductions for those who stay in
a given bracket or move to a lower bracket with tax increases for those who are pushed into a
higher bracket. Hence, an income quantile representation of tax changes would hide a lot of the
identifying variation in the data.
Each gure shows the sizes of the di¤erent groups as a share of all taxpayers (red bars) along
with the mechanical changes in the marginal net-of-tax rate in the di¤erent groups (blue graph).8
Figure 3 illustrates the variation in labor income taxation around the 1987-reform (1986-1989
di¤erence) in Panel A and around the 1994-reform (1993-1996 di¤erence) in Panel B. For the
1987-reform, there are very large and strongly heterogeneous tax changes across taxpayers, with
the percentage change in the net-of-tax rate varying between -20% and +42%. These di¤erences
in tax treatments across groups are larger than the tax treatment di¤erences created by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 in the U.S. and the Tax Reform of the Century in Sweden in 1991, two
reforms that have been extensively analyzed in the literature. For the 1994-reform, tax changes
are also very large and heterogeneous, but not quite to the same degree as for the 1987-reform.
Figures 4 and 5 show the variation in the taxation of negative and positive capital income
around the same two reform episodes. The gures are constructed in the same way as Figure
3 above. For the 1987-reform, the tax variation on capital income, especially negative capital
income, is even stronger than for labor income. The marginal net-of-tax rate for those in the
top bracket increased by more than 50% (40%) in the case of negative (positive) capital income,
while other groups of taxpayers experienced much smaller increases or reductions in the net-of-
tax rate. The 1994-reform have much smaller e¤ects than the 1987-reform and, importantly,
the tax variation created by the 1994-reform is qualitatively very di¤erent. For positive capital
income, for example, the net-of-tax rate is reduced at the top and increased at the bottom
directly opposite the 1987-reform.
Although the tax changes around 1987 and 1994 constitute the strongest variation in the data,
there is in fact a lot of variation throughout the period we consider (1984-2005). Importantly,
the tax variation in other years is often qualitatively di¤erent in terms of who experience tax
increases and who experiences tax cuts.
8The population shares of the seven groups do not quite sum to 100% due to a small number of taxpayers
below the excemption level for the bottom bracket.
106
5 Empirical Results
In the following, we describe the results from 2SLS-estimations using mechanical tax changes
as instruments. We present separate estimations for labor income, negative capital income, and
positive capital income. The rst-stage regressions (not shown) are always very strong. For
the second stage, we focus on the key elasticity parameters of interest and do not show point
estimates associated with the large number of covariates that we control for. The exact details
of the di¤erent regression specications that we consider are provided in the notes of regression
tables. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered by individual in order to account for any
individual-specic correlation in income changes over time.
Labor Income Elasticities
The rst set of results is presented in Table 4, which shows estimates of labor income elasticities
based on specications that assume no income e¤ects and no cross-tax e¤ects. The potential
importance of income e¤ects and cross-tax e¤ects are considered later on. The table splits the
sample by wage earners (Panel A) and self-employed individuals (Panel B), and shows results
for a number of di¤erent specications and sample restrictions that have been discussed in the
literature.
The di¤erent rows in the table consider di¤erent specications of pre-reform income controls:
no income controls, the di¤erent income controls proposed by Gruber and Saez (2002) and
Kopczuk (2005), along with specications that include richer controls for transitory income
components by including log-income changes from period s   2 to s   1 and from s   1 to
s. Results in the previous literature have been extremely sensitive to the specication of pre-
reform income controls. The di¤erent columns in the table consider di¤erent sample restrictions
(in addition to the basic restrictions described in section 3): all taxpayers with positive broad
income (dened as the sum of labor income, other personal income and capital income) in
columns (1) and (5), taxpayers with broad income above DKK 50,000 (about USD 10,000) in
columns (2) and (6), and taxpayers with broad income above DKK 100,000 (about USD 20,000)
in columns (3) and (7). Results in the previous literature have been very sensitive to such income
restrictions due to mean reversion at the bottom. Finally, columns (4) and (8) consider results
when taxpayers located close to kink points are excluded. This is done because the Gruber-
Saez style specications we consider assume that taxpayers behave as if they are located in the
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interior of brackets and do not bunch at kink points. If there is signicant bunching at kink
points, this may create bias in the estimates. As shown by Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven et
al. (2010), there is indeed bunching at the top kink in Denmark (but not at the bottom and
middle kinks) and we therefore investigate if our results are sensitive to this.
The table shows that results are extremely robust to both the specication of pre-reform
income controls and sample selection. While it does matter whether any income controls are
included (rst row versus subsequent rows), the exact specication of pre-reform income controls
is not important. Moreover, excluding taxpayers at the bottom (to avoid mean reversion at the
bottom) and excluding taxpayers around kink points (to avoid results being attenuated by
bunching) have very little impact on the results.9 Across all the specications shown in the
table (ignoring the rst row without any income controls), the elasticity of labor income vary
between 0.04 and 0.06 for wage earners and between 0.08 and 0.10 for self-employed individuals.
In the following tables, we no longer show the di¤erent sample restrictions considered in
Table 4, because those sample restrictions do not matter for any of our results. In all the tables
below, we include all taxpayers with positive broad income and do not drop observations around
kink points (as in columns (1) and (5) of Table 4). Table 5 consider the importance of income
e¤ects by including virtual income in the specication, and again we split the sample by wage
earners and self-employed individuals. As a benchmark, columns (1) and (4) repeat results from
a specication without income e¤ect as in Table 4. Those columns are labelled compensated
elasticity, although in a specication without income e¤ects there is of course no distinction
between the compensated and uncompensated elasticity. Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) show the
uncompensated elasticity and income elasticity based on specications with income e¤ects. In
those specications, the compensated elasticity is approximately equal to the uncompensated
elasticity minus the income elasticity.10
The general nding in Table 5 is that income elasticities are negative, implying that leisure
9 It is not very surprising that bunching around kink points has no signicant e¤ect on our results. Although
there is clear bunching at the top kink in Denmark, it a¤ects a small part of the population (see Table 3) and is
small in magnitude, especially for wage earners where the elasticity implied by bunching is only 0.01 (Chetty et al.
2011). Bunching is stronger for self-employed individuals, which is consistent with our nding that the impact of
excluding taxpayers around kink points is slightly larger for the self-employed than for wage earners. Notice also
that, as one would expect, elasticities become larger when excluding observations close to kinks, because those
taxpayers are constrained in their response to the reform-driven tax variation that we use for identication.
10This is an approximation because the income elasticity should be weighted by labor income as a share of total
income. Since this share is close to one for most taxpayers, this weighting have no large impact on the calculation
of the compensated elasticity.
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is a normal good, but very small. The nding of small income e¤ects is consonant with the
public nance and labor economics literatures in general. While the point estimates of income
e¤ects are roughly the same for wage earners and the self-employed, the income e¤ects are
statistically signicant only for wage earners where we have many more observations than for
the self-employed. In all specications, the compensated elasticity implied by the specication
with income e¤ects correspond closely to the elasticity obtained from the specication without
income e¤ects. Importantly, the results in Table 5 are again extremely robust to the specication
of pre-reform income controls.
Capital Income Elasticities
We now turn to the analysis of capital income responses. Capital income is a net income concept
that may be either positive or negative, and is in fact negative for the vast majority of taxpayers
in Denmark due to interest payments on mortgages and other loans. As described in section
2, the tax treatment of capital income is very di¤erent depending on whether the net value is
positive or negative, with much higher tax rates on positive than on negative capital income.
Since we consider log-linear regression specications that do not allow for non-positive income
values, we consider capital income in absolute value and run separate regressions for negative
and positive capital income.11
The results are shown in Table 6, which compares elasticities for negative and positive capital
income in columns (2) and (3) to elasticities for labor income in column (1). The table shows
results for all taxpayers (wage earners and self-employed individuals together) and is based on
specication without income e¤ects. Notice that we would expect the elasticity of negative
capital income (in absolute value) to be negative and the elasticity of positive capital income
to be positive, and this is indeed what we nd for all specications. Overall, capital income
elasticities tend to be 2-3 times larger in absolute value than labor income elasticities, and
11This strategy requires us to drop individuals with zero capital income as well as those whose capital income
switch sign between base and post year. An additional argument for dropping observations around zero capital
income is that the imposition of much higher marginal tax rates on positive than on negative capital income
(after the 1987-reform) creates a large kink in the capital income tax schedule at zero. This is associated with
strong incentives for bunching at zero capital income, a type of response that is not captured by the Gruber-Saez
estimation strategy and may create bias as discussed earlier. Indeed, we nd strong bunching in the data around
zero capital income. While this is interesting by itself and might o¤er a di¤erent way of uncovering capital income
elasticities, a key problem of exploiting bunching at zero capital income is that it is likely to partly reect non-tax
factors. Even without the tax kink, there would have been some excess clustering at zero as many taxpayers have
not accumulated any saving or debt because of their stage in the life cycle (e.g. young taxpayers) or because of
credit constraints.
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again the results are very robust the specication of pre-reform income controls. Elasticities of
negative capital income vary between -0.07 and -0.13 across all specications, while elasticities
of positive capital income vary between 0.08 and 0.14.
Responses to Small vs. Large Tax Reforms
In general, the responses estimated above are fairly modest, consistent with many other micro
studies of intensive responses to taxation such as hours-of-work responses (e.g. Heckman 1993;
Blundell and MaCurdy 1999; Meghir and Phillips 2010; Chetty 2011). An important question is
whether micro elasticities are small because they are attenuated by optimization frictions (such
as inattention and adjustment costs) or because the truestructural elasticity that overcomes
optimization frictions and matters for long-run behavior is small. As argued by Chetty et al.
(2011) and Chetty (2011), the estimation of long-run structural elasticities requires tax variation
that is large enough to overcome frictions. The Danish setting allows us to explore this question,
because the time period we consider includes one very large tax reform episode along with many
smaller tax reform episodes. In particular, the 1987-reform was associated with extremely large
tax variation (as shown in section 4.3) and this reform is perhaps the most widely discussed
and salient tax reform in Danish history. To test the hypothesis that elasticities are larger when
estimated from large tax changes as they overcome frictions and reveal the long-run structural
elasticity, we compare responses to the 1987-reform with responses to all the subsequent smaller
changes.
The results are shown in Table 7 for all reforms (1984-2005 period), 1987-reform (1984-
1990 period), and post-1987 reforms (1991-2005 period) for labor income (Panel A) and positive
capital income (Panel B). The elasticity estimations include all taxpayers (wage earners and self-
employed individuals together) and are based on specications without income e¤ects. We do
not show results for negative capital income, because it is associated with very little identifying
variation after the 1987-reform as there was just one bracket for negative capital income through
most of this period (see Figure 2, Panel B). The lack of variation for negative capital income after
the 1987-reform makes it di¢ cult to separately estimate responses for this period and income
type in a robust way.
The results in the table lend clear support to the hypothesis that micro elasticities are larger
when estimated using large tax variation. The labor income elasticity estimated from the 1987-
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reform is about 0.11-0.12, which is 2-3 times larger than elasticities based on the whole period
and 3-6 times larger than elasticities based on the post-1987 reforms alone. These results are
again robust to pre-reform income controls. Results for capital income are qualitatively similar,
but the di¤erence between large-reform elasticities (0.14-0.15) and small-reform elasticities (0.08-
0.10) is not as strong as for labor income. It is intuitive that the size of the tax change matters
more for labor income than for capital income, because labor income responses are likely to
be a¤ected by real adjustment costs (e.g. search costs) to a larger extent than capital income
responses. On the other hand, frictions due to for example inattention would matter for both
labor and capital income.
The results in Table 7 are qualitatively consistent with the ndings of Chetty et al. (2011),
who compare bunching around small and large kinks in the Danish tax code to evaluate the
importance of frictions in attenuating short-run responses and to estimate the long-run elasticity
that overcomes frictions. But the magnitude of the elasticity that we nd using the large 1987-
reform is much larger than the elasticity found by Chetty et al. (2011) using bunching at the large
top-tax kink. A likely explanation is that bunching around kink points, even large kink points,
are much more a¤ected by frictions due to the fact that bunching requires precise knowledge of
bracket thresholds along with a very precise behavioral response, both of which may be costly to
achieve due to adjustment costs, attention costs, etc. The reform-driven variation we consider
is likely to be less a¤ected by such aspects.
Cross-Tax E¤ects Between Labor and Capital Income:
The specications so far have ignored potential cross-tax e¤ects between labor and capital in-
come. Table 8 considers such e¤ects by presenting results from labor income regressions that
include the marginal net-of-tax rates on both labor income and capital income. The specica-
tion does not include income e¤ects on labor income, which are in any case weak and have little
impact on the results. The table considers all taxpayers (Panel A), wage earners (Panel B), and
self-employed individuals (Panel C). Each panel shows the own-tax elasticity on the left and
the cross-tax elasticity on the right. As in all other tables, we consider a number of di¤erent
specications of pre-reform income controls.
Overall, the table suggests that cross-tax e¤ects are not very important in the Danish tax
system. Cross-tax elasticities are in general very small (and sometimes insignicant), and al-
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lowing for such cross-tax e¤ects have very little impact on the own-tax elasticity compared to
the earlier tables that ignores those e¤ects. For wage earners, the cross-tax elasticity is positive
and very small, suggesting weak complementarity between labor and capital for those individu-
als. For the self-employed, the cross-tax elasticity is negative and somewhat larger in absolute
value (but not precisely estimated), suggesting weak substitutability between labor and capital
income for those individuals. The nding that labor and capital income are substitutes for the
self-employed is consistent with income shifting in response to di¤erential tax treatment of the
two income forms. While income shifting has been much discussed in the public nance liter-
ature (e.g. Slemrod 1995, 1998; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2010), there exists relatively little
direct evidence on this type of behavioral response.12
6 Conclusion
This paper presents an empirical study of taxable income responses using a series of tax reforms
that provide substantial tax variation across individuals, income forms, and over time. The
variation provided by the Danish tax reforms does not feature the same strong correlation
between tax changes and income levels as the tax reforms in the U.S. (and other countries) that
have been extensively studied in the past two decades. Arguably, this allows us to overcome
the identication problems arising from non-tax changes in the income distribution and mean-
reversion that plague much of the existing literature (as discussed by e.g. Saez, Slemrod, and
Giertz 2010). Unlike previous studies, our results are very robust to the specication of controls
for non-tax changes in the income distribution and mean reversion, which suggests that we have
controlled in a su¢ ciently rich way for non-tax factors impacting on taxable income. The Danish
setting therefore o¤ers a useful laboratory for a credible estimation of taxable income responses.
As pointed out by Slemrod (1998) and Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), taxable income elastic-
ities are not structural parameters that depend only on individual preferences. They depend in
important ways on the opportunities for tax avoidance and tax evasion, which in turn depend on
the tax structure (especially the broadness of tax bases) and on tax enforcement. The fairly low
taxable income elasticities that we nd for Denmark, despite the presence of very high marginal
12Previous evidence on income shifting include Pirttilä and Selin (2011) on shifting between labor and capital
income in Finland, Slemrod (1996) and Gordon and Slemrod (2000) on shifting between personal and corporate
income in the United States, and Kleven and Waseem (2011) on shing between wage income and self-employment
income in Pakistan.
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tax rates, suggests that the Danish system o¤ers small opportunities for avoidance and evasion.
There are two main reasons for this. First, tax bases are very broad and o¤er limited opportu-
nities for deductions and negative capital income to count against the income tax base. Second,
as shown by Kleven et al. (2011), tax enforcement is very e¤ective and overall tax compliance
is high due to the widespread use of double-reporting by third parties such as employers and
nancial institutions. The overall conclusion that emerges from the two studies together is that
a tax system with the broadest possible bases and extensive use of information reporting can
impose high marginal tax rates with fairly modest behavioral responses.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the e¤ects of income taxation on the international migration of
top earners using the Danish preferential foreigner tax scheme. This scheme, introduced
in 1991, allows immigrants with high earnings (above 103,000 Euros per year as of 2009)
to be taxed at a at rate of 25% for a duration of three years instead of the regular
progressive schedule with a top marginal tax rate of 59%. Using population wide Danish
administrative tax data, we show that the scheme doubled the number of highly paid
foreigners in Denmark relative to slightly less paid ineligible foreigners, which translates
into a very large elasticity of migration with respect to the net-of-tax rate in excess of one.
There is bunching of earnings at the scheme eligibility threshold, evidence of a signicant
but quantitatively very small response along the intensive earnings margin (work e¤ort or
earnings manipulation through tax avoidance). There is also evidence of sharp bunching
of durations of stay at the three year duration limit which translates into a signicant but
quantitatively small intensive duration response. In the end, the migration elasticity is
much more larger than the conventional within country elasticity of earnings with respect
to the net-of-tax rate. Hence, preferential tax schemes for highly paid workers could
generate very harmful tax competition across European countries and severely limit the
ability of European governments to use progressive taxation.
We would like to thank Raj Chetty, Michael Devereux, Rick Hornbeck, Caroline Hoxby, Wojciech Kopczuk,
Claus Kreiner, and numerous seminar participants for helpful comments and discussions. Financial support
from the Center for Equitable Growth at UC Berkeley, the Economic Policy Research Network (EPRN) and the
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1 Introduction
Tax-induced international mobility of talent is a controversial public policy issue, especially
when tax rates di¤er substantially across countries and migration barriers are low as in the case
of the European Union. High tax rates on highly paid workers may induce such workers to
migrate to countries where the tax burden for top earners is lower. This can limit the ability
of governments to raise taxes using progressive taxation by creating harmful tax competition.
This issue is further exacerbated by the development of special favorable tax treatment reserved
to highly skilled or highly compensated foreigners in a number of European countries.1 As a
result, the mobility response to tax rates looms even larger in the European policy debate on
tax progressivity than traditional within-country labor supply responses.
While an enormous empirical literature has studied labor supply and taxable income re-
sponses to taxation (as surveyed by, e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy 1999 for labor supply, and
Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2011 for taxable income), there is very little empirical work on the
e¤ect of taxation on the spatial mobility of individuals, and especially mobility among high-
skilled workers. A small literature has considered the mobility of people across local jurisdictions
within countries, including Kirchgassner and Pommerehne (1996) and Liebig et al. (2007) on
mobility across Swiss Cantons in response to Canton taxes, Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) and
Bakija and Slemrod (2004) on mobility across U.S. states in response to state income and in-
heritance taxes, and Meyer (2000) on mobility across U.S. states in response to state welfare
programs. However, empirical work on the e¤ect of taxation on international mobility appears
to be virtually non-existent2 partly due to lack of micro data with citizenship information and
challenges in identifying causal tax e¤ects on migration. A recent exception is Kleven, Landais,
and Saez (2010) who analyze the labor market for professional football players across 14 Euro-
pean Union countries and nd compelling evidence of tax-induced mobility responses. However,
a concern is that football players might be substantially more mobile than other highly skilled
workers. In that case, the signicant migration responses of Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2010)
1Besides Denmark which we will analyze in this paper, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland also have
preferential tax schemes for foreign workers that are signicant.
2There is a very large literature on the e¤ects of capital taxation on multinational corporations and interna-
tional capital mobility (surveyed by, e.g., Gordon and Hines 2002). There is also an enormous literature on wage
di¤erentials and international migration (surveyed by, e.g., Borjas 1999), and some work on how international
migration is a¤ected by the generosity of social insurance and social welfare programs (e.g. Borjas 1999b).
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would not be informative about the migration responses of high-skilled workers in general.3
This paper breaks new ground on this issue by analyzing the migration e¤ects of a special tax
scheme that applies to highly compensated foreign workers in Denmark regardless of occupation
or industry.
In 1992, Denmark enacted a preferential tax regime for foreign researchers and high-income
foreigners in all other professions, who sign contracts for work in Denmark after June 1, 1991.
Under this scheme, the income tax rate is reduced to a at rate of 25% (30% before 1996) for
a total period of up to 3 years. Except for researchers, eligibility for this tax scheme requires
an annual income above a certain threshold, which was set to 511,200 Danish kroner (about
69,000 Euros) when the scheme was introduced in 1992 and indexed to average earnings growth
in subsequent years. As of 2009, the earnings threshold is about 103,000 Euros corresponding
roughly to the 99th percentile of the distribution of individual earnings in Denmark.4 This
scheme is much more generous than the regular tax system, which imposes a top marginal tax
rate of 59% above a relatively modest annual income of 350,000 kroner (47,000 Euros). Absent
the special tax scheme, workers with earnings above the scheme threshold would face average
income tax rates around 55%, more than twice as high as the scheme rate. When the 3 years of
preferential tax treatment have been used up, the taxpayer will be subject to the ordinary tax
scheme imposing very high tax rates.5
This unusual piece of tax policy implies large discontinuities in tax liability depending on
the contract start date (before and after June 1, 1991), duration of stay in Denmark (3-year
and 7-year rules), earnings level (earnings eligibility threshold), and occupation (researchers
versus other professions). Hence, the reform creates very large quasi-experimental variation
along several di¤erent dimensions, and provides a very powerful way of identifying the e¤ect
of taxation on migration. It is very unusual to have large discontinuities in tax liability (as
opposed to discontinuities in marginal tax rates) in tax systems. In this paper, we explore
3In particular, top footballers are young workers who earn most of their lifetime income over a short time
period, and their profession involves relatively little country-specic capital. Furthermore, Kleven, Landais, and
Saez (2010) do not have earnings level data on footballers, making it di¢ cult to control for incidence e¤ects of
taxes on wages.
4The scheme also applies to Danish citizens, who have been abroad with no Danish source earnings for a
period of at least 3 years.
5In the original law, after 7 years of residence in Denmark, a worker who had beneted from the preferential
tax scheme would be subject to a claw-back whereby ordinary tax rates applied retroactively to the entire income
earned during the period of preferential tax treatment. For a high-income worker, this rule implied a very large
retroactive tax bill after 7 years of residence. The rule was eliminated for researchers in 1998 and substantially
relaxed for all other professions in 2002, so that today the retro-active tax applies to very few workers.
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the di¤erent aspects of the tax scheme using quasi-experimental techniques such as bunching
approaches and di¤erence-in-di¤erences. For this analysis, we have access to administrative
data including the universe of tax and payroll records for the entire population of Danish
residents (Danish citizens and foreigners) since 1980. The data includes detailed information
about citizenship, immigration history, income and tax variables, labor market variables, and
socio-demographic information. It also contains specic information for all scheme beneciaries.
The data were specically prepared by Statistics Denmark for our research project and securely
accessed through a server at the Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR).
Our analysis of the Danish tax scheme for foreigners yields two main results. First and
most important, we obtain compelling evidence that the scheme had a very large e¤ect on the
number of highly paid foreigners in Denmark. The number of foreigners paid above the eligibility
threshold almost doubles relative to the number of foreigners paid slightly below the threshold
after the scheme is introduced. This e¤ect builds up in the rst ve years of the scheme and
remains stable afterwards. This overall e¤ect implies that the overall elasticity of migration
with respect to the net-of-tax rate is very large, in excess of one. The resulting tax revenue
maximizing rate for highly paid foreigners is therefore relatively small and around 40%. Taking
into account all other taxes, including the VAT and payroll taxes, this implies that the very low
25% at rate in Denmark is actually very close to the revenue-maximizing tax rate on high-
income foreigners. Hence, it can be desirable from a single country perspective to adopt such
preferential schemes for highly paid foreigners. At the same time, those schemes impose negative
scal externalities on other countries and are detrimental to global welfare. This tension between
country welfare and global welfare in tax policy making has loomed large in the public debate
for a long time, but our paper provides for the rst time compelling evidence that this is indeed
a major tax policy issue. Absent coordination, it is conceivable that many countries would start
adopting and extending such schemes which could unravel tax progressivity in Europe.
Second, using a simple theoretical framework, we decompose the global elasticity described
above into the three underlying margins: the extensive migration margin, the intensive duration-
of-stay margin, and the intensive earnings margin which includes labor supply adjustment and
earnings manipulation through tax avoidance to qualify for the scheme threshold. Overall, the
extensive migration margin accounts for over 80% of the total elasticity. The notch created by
the earnings eligibility threshold does create a highly visible piling up in the density of earnings
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for foreigners at the eligibility threshold (relative to controls) but this piling up is quantitatively
extremely small relative the very large notch in the budget set. Using the methodology developed
by Kleven and Waseem (2011), we nd that the implied elasticity of earnings with respect to
the marginal net-of-tax rate is less than .01. The kink in the life-time budget created by 3-year
duration limit of the scheme does create sharp bunching in the density of duration of highly
paid foreigners at the 3-year cuto¤ (relative to controls), but this bunching is also quantitatively
small. Using the methodology developed by Saez (2010), we nd that this bunching translates
into an elasticity of duration of stay (conditional on being in the scheme) with respect the
net-of-tax rate around .1. Hence, this decomposition analysis reinforces our earlier nding
that the migration elasticity is an order of magnitude larger than the elasticity of reported
earnings, which has been the primary focus in the empirical literature on behavioral responses
to individual taxation. This also makes it particularly important for advanced economies and
particularly European countries to start creating and sharing data on labor migration, especially
among highly skilled workers, to monitor the extent of tax induced mobility.
Finally, it is important to note that our results are based on a single small country, Denmark,
with a specic language, culture, location and climate. It is a country where almost everybody
speaks English and it provides a high quality of life and government services. Furthermore, it
is a small and relatively homogeneous country with no strong tradition of immigration. Hence,
relative to other countries with stronger traditions of immigration, such as the United States,
Denmark starts from a very small base of highly paid foreigners. As a result, in terms of
external validity, the extremely large elasticity estimated for Denmark might not carry over to
larger countries starting with a higher base of foreign workers. This is closely related to the
important point made by Kanbur and Keen (2003) in the context of capital mobility that tax
heavens tend to be small countries because small countries start with small bases and hence can
large elasticities by granting favorable tax treatment to foreigners. We hope that our pioneering
work can be applied to the many other countries, which have adopted such schemes if/when
data become available in the future.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents key features of the Danish tax scheme,
proposes a simple theoretical framework, and describes the administrative data we use. Section
3 presents the empirical analysis, while section 4 concludes by discussing policy implications
and future work on analyzing spillovers.
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2 Context, Conceptual Framework, and Data
2.1 The Danish Tax Scheme
In 1992, Denmark enacted a preferential tax scheme for foreign researchers and high-income
foreigners in all other professions, who sign contracts for employment in Denmark after June
1st, 1991. The scheme is commonly known in Denmark as the ResearchersTax Scheme. When
the scheme was rst introduced, it o¤ered a at income tax rate of 30% in lieu of the regular
progressive income tax with a top marginal tax rate of more than 60% and an average tax rate
on high-income workers around 55%. The scheme rate was reduced to 25% in 1995, but at
the same time a labor market contribution was added, leaving the total scheme rate roughly
unchanged around 30%.
The scheme can be used for a total period of up to 36 months after which the taxpayer
becomes subject to the ordinary income tax schedule. The 36 months do not have to be taken
together, but can be divided into any number of spells over an unlimited period of time.6 As we
discuss in more detail in the next section, this form of duration dependence creates a discrete
jump in marginal lifetime tax liability with respect to duration at the 3-year cuto¤ a kink in
the lifetime budget set as a function of duration. Besides this form of duration dependence, the
initial scheme design stipulated that a worker who stayed in Denmark for another 48 months
after having benetted from the special tax scheme would face a claw-back equal to the entire
tax savings during the period of preferential tax treatment. For a worker who had benetted
from the scheme for the maximum 3-year period, this rule implied a very large retroactive tax
bill after 7 years of residence. This form of duration dependence creates a discrete jump in
total lifetime tax liability at the 7-year cuto¤ a notch in the lifetime budget set as a function
of duration. The duration notch was eliminated for researchers in year 2000 and substantially
relaxed for all other professions in year 2002, so that today it applies to very few workers.
There are two key requirements to become eligible for the preferential tax scheme. The rst
requirement is that the taxpayer has been recruited abroad and not been tax liable in Denmark
in the 3 years prior to going on the scheme.7 Until very recently, citizenship played no formal role
6After 2008 (outside our data period), an additional scheme option was introduced whereby eligible workers
can choose between the standard scheme rate of 25% for 36 months and a higher scheme rate of 33% for 60
months (a labor market contribution comes in addition to both of those rates). Reports suggest that the take-up
of the newly introduced 60-month scheme option has been very low.
7For taxpayers who split scheme take-up into several spells, the 3-year eligibility requirement applies to each
spell separately. But in assessing whether a taxpayer has been tax liable in Denmark prior to a given scheme
136
in determining eligibility, and therefore Danish citizens who had been living and paying taxes
abroad for at least 3 years could also apply for the scheme. Those rules have now been changed
such that Danish citizens must be foreign tax residents for 10 years in order to become eligible
for the scheme, but this reform lies outside our current data period. The second requirement is
that, unless the worker qualies as a researcher, annual employment earnings must be at least
765,600 Danish kroner (about 103,000 Euros) in 2009 prices. The threshold grows roughly at
the same rate as the average earnings level in Denmark. This cuto¤ lies between the 99th and
99.5th percentile of the Danish employment earnings distribution. As the preferential scheme
rate applies to all units of earnings conditional on eligibility, the earnings requirement creates
a discrete jump in total annual tax liability at the cuto¤ a notch in the annual budget set as
a function of earnings.
In terms of administration, the scheme treatment had to be requested by the employer.
Hence, the employer has to show the tax authorities that the level of earnings is above the
eligibility threshold and that other qualifying requirements are met. Importantly, the threshold
for eligibility applies only to earnings with the specic employer requesting the scheme. Having
other sources of income or earnings does not help qualify. The threshold of eligibility must be
met on an annualized basis. Hence for a contract of 6 months, the eligibility threshold is that
the 6 months of pay must be at least half of the annual threshold, i.e., 51,150 Euros (as of
2009). If the scheme beneciary has other income besides scheme earnings, that income is taxed
according to the standard progressive income tax schedule and completely independently of
scheme earnings. In other words, scheme earnings are e¤ectively taxed at a at rate completely
independently of the other circumstances of the individual.
To summarize, the special Danish tax scheme creates the following tax variation. First, the
scheme introduced much lower tax rates on a specic sample of people (high-income foreigners;
not tax liable in Denmark 3 years prior) at a given point in time. This variation provides an
ideal setting for a di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis of migration e¤ects. Second, the scheme
introduced a 3-year duration kink among those who migrate to Denmark, providing sharp
quasi-experimental variation that can be used to study the e¤ects of taxation on duration of
stay. Third, the scheme originally introduced a 7-year duration notch, which in principle o¤er
more quasi-experimental variation to study duration. However, since this rule was eliminated
spell, the time spent in Denmark under prior scheme spells are not counted.
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for most taxpayers not long after the rst scheme participants could potentially hit the 7-year
notch, we do not have enough observations around the notch to study this precisely. Fourth,
the scheme introduced an earnings notch creating very strong incentives for foreigners to have
earnings above the income cuto¤. This creates compelling quasi-experimental variation to study
earnings responses to taxation among foreign migrants.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
We consider a two-country model consisting of a destination country for potential migrants
(Denmark) denoted by d and a home country of migrants (rest of the world) denoted by h. The
destination country is small and its tax policy therefore does not impact the equilibrium in the
rest of the world.
Consider a migrant who spends Y years in Denmark out of a total working life of Y years.
The utility obtained while in Denmark is given by
ud =
Z Y
0
(
zdy   T df
 
zdy ; y
  nhz zdy
n
!)
dy  

+ hY

Y


 1 (Y > 0) ; (1)
where zdy is before-tax earnings in Denmark in year y, T
d
f () is the tax schedule for foreigners
in Denmark (which may depend on both earnings and the year of Danish residence), hz () is
disutility of hours worked, n is labor market ability,  is a moving cost, hY () is a disutility
of spending Y years in Denmark, and the parameter  captures preferences for Denmark. The
disutility functions hz; hY are increasing and convex, so that larger values of the parameters n; 
are associated with lower marginal disutility (of working and being in Denmark, respectively).
The utility outside of Denmark is given by
uh =
Z Y
Y
(
zhy   T h
 
zhy
  nhz zhy
n
!)
dy =
 
Y   Y zh   T h  zh  nhz zh
n

; (2)
where zhy is before-tax earnings at home in year y and T
h () is the annual tax schedule in the
home country (which does not depend on the number of years spent there). The second equality
uses that, because annual tax liability at home is not a function of the year of residence y, the
earnings choice is the same in every period (zhy = z
h).
Total lifetime utility is given by ud + uh, which is maximized with respect to time spent in
Denmark Y , earnings in Denmark in each period zdy , and earnings at home z
h. Choosing time
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spent in Denmark consists of an extensive margin (Y = 0 vs. Y > 0) and an intensive margin
(size of Y conditional on Y > 0).
There is heterogeneity in three dimensions: moving costs , preferences for Denmark , and
labor market ability n. There is a smooth distribution of potential migrants characterized by
the density function f (; ; n) on the domain D = (0;1) (0;1) (0;1).
As a benchmark, we start from a smooth (continuously di¤erentiable) tax schedule on for-
eigners in Denmark. Denoting the marginal tax rate on earnings by  df
 
zdy ; y
  @T df (zdy ;y)
@zdy
,
foreigner earnings in year y in Denmark are characterized by
h0z
 
zdy
n
!
= 1   df
 
zdy ; y

: (3)
Duration in Denmark Y (conditional on Y > 0) is characterized by
h0Y

Y


=

zdY   T df
 
zdY ; Y
  nhz zdY
n

 

zh   T h  zh  nhz zh
n

: (4)
The left-hand side is the marginal disutility of time spent in Denmark, while the right-hand
side is the marginal consumption increase net of disutility working from time spent in Denmark
instead of at home. If the tax schedule were independent of year of residence (in which case
T df
 
zdY ; Y

and hence zdY would be independent of Y ), then the right-hand side would be constant
in Y . For the intensive-margin choice of Y to be positive, the right-hand side must be positive at
zero duration, which depends on tax liability at zero duration (T df
 
zd0 ; 0

compared to T h
 
zh

)
and on earnings and therefore marginal tax rates at zero duration ( df
 
zd0 ; 0

compared to
h
 
zh

).
Let us now consider the extensive-margin choice of whether to move to Denmark at all.
Moving to Denmark requires that lifetime utility ud + uh is higher under Y > 0 (given optimal
choices of Y and zdy as characterized above) than under Y = 0, which implies
 
Z Y
0
(
zdy   T df
 
zdy ; y
  nhz zdy
n
!)
dy hY

Y


 Y

zh   T h  zh  nhz zh
n

; (5)
where zdy = z
d
y (n) is determined by (3) and Y = Y (n; ) is determined by (4). We denote the
right-hand side of (5) by  =  (n; ). The total number of people migrating to Denmark is
then given by
N =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Z (n;)
0
f (; ; n) dddn: (6)
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The total amount of time spent by migrants in Denmark is given by
S = N  E [Y ] =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Z (n;)
0
f (; ; n)Y (n; ) dddn; (7)
where E [Y ] is the average duration among those who migrate to Denmark. The total amount
of earnings created by migrants in Denmark is given by
N  E Y  zd = Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Z (n;)
0
Z Y (n;)
0
f (; ; n) zdy (n) dydddn; (8)
where zd 
hR Y
0
zdydy
i
=Y is average earnings per year in Denmark and E

Y  zd is average
earnings over the entire stay in Denmark among all migrants.
We dene by
e =
1  td
S
@S
@(1  td)
the global elasticity of migrants S with respect to the net-of-tax rate 1   td where td is the
average tax rate in Denmark. This elasticity is dened for a given maximum duration y and
given tax rates in the home country. Naturally, e is likely to increase with y as it is likely to be
small for small y (and actually zero when y = 0). For very large y, the elasticity converges
to e which is the conventional elasticity of migration with respect to the net-of-tax rate using
in optimal tax models with migration such as Mirrlees (1982).
We dene by
eA =
1  td
N
@N
@(1  td)
the elasticity of arrivals N with respect to the net-of-tax rate 1  td where td is the average tax
rate in Denmark. This capture the extensive margin of arrivals.
We will estimate the e¤ect of taxation on all three dimensions of behavior in eqs. (6)-(8): the
number of migrants, average duration of stay, and average earnings among those who migrate
to Denmark. We do this using a reform that introduced sharp changes in the tax schedule on
foreigners T df
 
zdy ; y

. Before the reform, the tax schedule T df
 
zdy ; y

was the same as for domestic
residents, a standard piecewise linear function of earnings with no duration dependence. After
the reform, the tax schedule T df
 
zdy ; y

had much lower rates than the domestic schedule and
a very di¤erent structure. The new schedule o¤ers a low at tax rate under two eligibility
requirements. First, the schedule is dependent on duration of stay in Denmark with low tax
rates applying to years y  y and high tax rates (standard domestic rates) applying to years
y > y. As the higher rates apply only to the period after y, this policy creates a discrete jump
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in the marginal tax with respect to duration Y (which is given by T df
 
zdY ; Y

) and therefore a
kink in the budget set with respect to duration Y . Second, eligibility for the low at tax in a
given year requires earnings zdy above a cuto¤ z
, with standard domestic tax rates applying to
immigrants with earnings below z. As the low at tax applies to all units of income for those
with earnings above the cuto¤ z, this piece of policy creates a discrete jump in tax liability
with respect to earnings and therefore a notch in the budget set.
Figure 1 illustrates behavioral responses to the duration kink (Panel A) and the earnings
notch (Panel B). Panel A considers individuals at a given ability n (high enough for earnings
to be above the earnings notch z), but with di¤erent preferences  for staying in Denmark.
Indi¤erence curves represent preferences over duration Y and "net consumption" dened as
lifetime consumption net of disutility of working. The slope of the indi¤erence curves is given by
h0Y
 
Y


, corresponding to the left-hand side of equation (4). The slope of the budget line (dened
with respect to net consumption) is given by the right-hand side of equation (4). Starting from
a duration-independent tax schedule (so that T df
 
zdY ; Y

does not change with Y and therefore
zdY does not change with Y ), the slope of the budget line is constant in Y . In this case, the
durations among immigrants is smoothly distributed reecting the smooth distribution of .
Suppose now that tax liability T df
 
zdy ; y

is increased after year y (at a given level of earnings).
This creates a kink in the budget line at Y = y as the slope on the right-hand side of equation
(4) jumps. This kink produces bunching of individuals whose durations were falling into a
segment [y; y +y] before the kink was introduced. Individual L has the shortest pre-kink
duration (smallest ) among those who bunch at the kink; this individual chooses duration y
both before and after the reform. Individual H has the longest pre-kink duration (largest )
among those who bunch at the kink; this individual chooses duration y + y before the tax
reform and duration y after the reform. Every individual between L and H locates at the kink
point, which creates total bunching B =
R y+y
y g0 (y) dy where g0 () denotes the counterfactual
(pre-kink) duration distribution. Based on estimates of g0 (y) and B, this relationship yields the
duration response y which can be used to back out the compensated elasticity of duration
with respect to the tax rate following the method developed in Saez 2010. Saez (2010) shows
that the intensive elasticity eI can be approximated by the following equation:
y
y
' eI 
1  
where t is the location of the kink equal to 3 years here and  is the change in marginal
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incentive (in the life-time budget) and  the current marginal tax rate (in the life-time budget).
Panel B considers the implications of the earnings notch. This diagram considers earnings
choices zdy at a point in time y < y
 for individuals with di¤erent abilities n. Indi¤erence
curves represent preferences over labor supply zdy=n and consumption c
d
y at a point in time in
Denmark (the slope of which is h0z
 
zdy=n

) and the budget set is given by cdy = z
d
y   T df
 
zdy ; y

.
For simplicity of exposition, we start from a linear tax schedule before the reform (although in
practice the pre-existing schedule was piecewise linear). Under the baseline tax system, there is
a smooth distribution of earnings reecting the smooth distribution of n. Now a preferential at
tax is introduced for foreigners, conditional on having earnings above a cuto¤ z. This creates
an upward notch in the budget set at z, which produces bunching at z combined with a hole
in the density distribution in an interval [z  z; z]. Individual L has the lowest pre-notch
income (lowest n) among those who locate at the notch point; this individual chooses earnings
z z before the reform and is exactly indi¤erent between z z and the the notch point
z after the reform. Individual H has the highest pre-notch income (highest n) among those
who locate at the notch point; this individual chooses earnings z0 before the reform and earnings
z after the reform. Individuals who were initially between z0 and z move to the upper bracket
(strictly above z) such that no individuals locate between z  z and z under the notched
schedule. The total amount of bunching is given by B =
R z0
z z h0 (z) dz where h0 () denotes
the counterfactual (pre-notch) earnings distribution. A technical complication is that estimates
of B and h0 (z) are not su¢ cient to reveal z as we do not know z0.8 A lower bound on the size
of the earnings response can be obtained by assuming z0 ' z (corresponding to an assumption
that the uncompensated elasticity is not too large). Based on an estimate of z obtained in
this way, it is possible to back out the compensated elasticity of earnings with respect to the
marginal tax rate using the method set out by Kleven and Waseem (2011).9
8This is an issue specic to upward notches and does not arise in the case of downward notches (Kleven and
Waseem 2011).
9When implementing this strategy empirically, the above bunching formula should be modied to account for
the fact the that the observed below notch density will not be completely empty on the interval [z  z; z]
due to the presence of frictions. To deal with this, Kleven and Waseem (2011) propose a bunching formula of the
form B =
R z
z z [h0 (z)  h (z)] dz where h (z) is the observed below notch earnings density (which captures
those who are stuck on the segment [z  z; z] due to frictions).
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2.3 Administrative Tax Data
The data we use in this paper comes from an administrative dataset including the Universe of
tax and payroll records for all resident individuals in Denmark including both Danish citizens
and foreigners since 1980. The data include detailed information about income and tax vari-
ables, labor market variables, and socio-demographic information. Most importantly, the data
contains very specic citizenship and migration information. Each individual working in Den-
mark must receive a personal identication number (CPR) in order to pay withholding taxes,
rent an apartment, etc. The application for a CPR number contains detailed questions about
citizenship and date of entry in Denmark, as well as about the country of in-migration. The
registry administration updates this information in case an individual leaves the country, but
this update can take a few years, and therefore we only have precise information about in and
out migration until 2005. The data also contains very detailed information for all scheme bene-
ciaries with precise information on starting and ending dates of labor contracts. Unfortunately,
this information was not computerized for the rst years of the scheme and therefore we do not
have individual wage information available for scheme beneciaries for the years 1991 to 1994
included.
2.4 Summary Statistics
Number and Composition of Scheme Workers.
Figure 2 reports the composition of beneciaries of the tax scheme (excluding researchers) by
country of citizenship (Panel A) across all years 1991 to 2006. Unsurprisingly, the vast majority
of scheme workers come from advanced economies, 25% come from Nordic countries, 10% are
Danish citizens (who qualify as others as long as they have not paid taxes in Denmark for 3
years or more), 19% from the United Kingdom or Ireland, 10% from Northern-America, and
about 20% from Germany, France, and Benelux combined. The number coming from emerging
countries or Eastern Europe and Russia is extremely modest.
Take-up Rate.
Figure 3 reports the take-up rate for the scheme among foreigners arriving in Denmark with
(annualized) earnings above the eligibility threshold and who have not paid taxes in Denmark
over the last 3 years. The take-up rate is high, around 70%, but still signicantly below 100%
143
for a variety of reasons. First, companies have to le out an application form for each employee
eligible for the scheme. It is conceivable that not all companies knew about the scheme or were
willing to do the administrative paperwork. Second, some individuals may not have been willing
to take-up the scheme perhaps because of the claw-back rule after 7 years. Third, individuals
may not be fully aware of the existence of the scheme, or might come to Denmark as political
refugees. Following the Dayton Peace Agreements in December 1995 for instance, there was
an important inux of migrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina, who were for the most part political
refugees and some of them being high-skilled workers, creating a drop in the take-up rate of the
scheme in 1995-1996.
3 Empirical Evidence on Behavioral Responses
In this section, we rst estimate in Section 3.1 the overall e¤ect of the reform and summarize the
e¤ect with a global elasticity. In the following subsections and using the conceptual framework
we developed earlier, we decompose the global e¤ect into a migration extensive e¤ect, intensive
labor supply e¤ect on the job, and intensive e¤ect along the duration of stay margin.
3.1 Global Reduced-Form Elasticity
The most transparent way to test whether the Danish tax scheme had an impact is to plot the
number of foreigners with earnings above the threshold overtime as we do in Figure 4. The
series (denoted as treatment in the gure) shows that the number of highly paid foreigners
was fairly stable around 800 from 1980 to 1990 before the scheme was implemented. After the
scheme takes place in 1991, denoted as a vertical line in the gure, there is a steady increase in
the number of highly paid foreigners. The number highly paid foreigners reaches over 3000 in
2006. Naturally, it is conceivable that the number of highly paid foreigners could have increased
absent the scheme because of European Union labor market integration following the Single
European Act signed in 1986 and implemented in 1992. The simplest way to control for such
trends is to also plot series of the number of highly paid foreigners slightly below the threshold
of eligibility for the scheme. Figure 4 therefore reports the number of foreigners in Denmark
with earnings between 80% and 90% of the threshold (control 1) and with earnings between
90% and 99.5% of the threshold (control 2). Both series are normalized so that they match
the treatment series in 1991 the year before the scheme was rst implemented. Three lessons
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emerge from those controls.
First, the control series follow very closely the treatment series before the scheme is im-
plemented. All three series are remarkably stable providing credibility to our assumption that
those groups of foreigners below the threshold are good control groups for the treatment group
above the threshold. Second, after the scheme is implemented, the control groups series only
increase modestly in the rst 5 years. By 1995, the control series are virtually identical to 1990
levels while the treatment series have almost doubled. After 1995, the control series increase
steadily over time but much more slowly than the treatment series. Indeed, after 1995, the
treatment series are consistently about twice are high as the control series. Third, there might
be a concern that highly paid foreigners above the threshold are displacing highly paid foreigners
slightly below the threshold through intensive earnings responses as we described in the theory
section. For example, a company that was planning to hire a foreigner just below the threshold
might adjust the contract to require slightly more work for a slightly higher pay qualifying for
the contract. It might also shift the form of compensation to increase cash compensation at the
expense of fringe benets or on the job perks that do not qualify toward the threshold. Such
shifting should produce a dip in the number of foreigners just below the threshold relative to
foreigners further down below the threshold. The very close and parallel pattern of evolution of
both control groups (the one just below the threshold 90% to 99.5% and the one further down
the threshold 80 to 90%) shows that this dip e¤ect was not signicant. We will come back to
this issue in more detail when we analyze earnings densities for foreigners around the threshold
in Section 3.2.
Figure 5 shows heterogeneity in responses by country of origin of foreign immigrants. It
repeats Figure 4 but restricting foreigners to sub-groups of countries: Nordic Countries (Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden) in Panel A, English Speaking Countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland,
New Zealand, UK, US) in Panel B. Continental Europe (all other European countries excluding
Eastern Europe) in Panel C, and all other countries in Panel D. The gure shows that each
country group experienced a large migration e¤ect. However, there is heterogeneity across
country groups: the response is somewhat smaller for Nordic countries and continental Europe
and signicantly larger for English speaking countries. Other countries (primarily Eastern
Europe) show at rst no response and then a very large response after 1996 when migration
from Eastern Europe to Denmark was liberalized.
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An additional concern with our analysis is that there might have been a widening of earnings
inequality in Denmark since the 1990s. Such widening would have increased the number of
workers paid above the threshold both among Danish natives and foreigners and hence led to a
divergence in the number of foreigners in the treatment group and control groups even absent
any scheme e¤ect. The threshold for eligibility always lies between the 99th and the 99.5th
percentile of the full earnings distribution among Danish adults with positive earnings. This
concern is unlikely to be an issue in the case of Denmark as Kleven and Schultz (2011) have
shown that top income shares have remained remarkably stable in Denmark since 1980. We
address this issue with our data in two ways.
First, Figure 6 plots average earnings in various upper percentile groups both below and
above the threshold among Danish citizens (normalized to 1 in 1990). It shows quite parallel
trends for all groups conrming the ndings of Kleven and Schultz (2011) that the upper tail
of the earnings distribution did not widen in Denmark in recent decades.
Second, Figure 8, Panel A then plots the fraction of foreigners in various percentiles of the
earnings distribution. We have a gap in 1991-1994 because the scheme related data does not
provide scheme earnings for those years. Two important ndings should be noted from the gure.
First the fraction of foreigners in each percentile is very stable before 1991.10 Second, after 1991,
the fraction of foreigners increases much more rapidlyboth in absolute and percentage terms
in the the two top groups above percentile 99.5th where the scheme applies. Normalizing the
fraction of foreigners to one in 1991, in Figure 8, Panel B, we see that the fraction of foreigners
doubles from 1990 to 1995 above percentile 99th while it remains pretty stable below percentile
99th.
In conclusion, estimates based on the fraction of foreigners in various xed percentiles of the
distribution, which can fully control for changes in earnings dispersion deliver roughly the same
doubling e¤ect as our earlier estimates based on the increase in foreigners above the xed (in
real terms) threshold. Hence, if we use as identication assumption that, absent the scheme,
the relative number of foreigners above the threshold would have increased at the same rate as
the number of foreigners slightly below the threshold, we nd an extremely large doubling e¤ect
of the scheme.
Table 1 summarizes the graphical evidence described above and gives more formal estimates
10The fraction of foreigners is higher, around 5%, above the 99.9th percentile, than in percentiles 96 to 99.9
where it is around 2 to 3%.
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of the e¤ect of the tax scheme on the total number of foreigners in Denmark. We estimate
di¤erence-in-di¤erence models of the following form:
Yit = 0 + tr  1[i = 1] + rf  1[t > 1991] + trrf  1[i = 1]  1[t > 1991] + it
where Yit is the total number of foreigners (weighted by duration) in income group i = 0; 1
present in Denmark in year t. Assuming that, absent the reform, the number of foreigners
would have followed the same trend in the control (i = 0) and treatment (i = 1) group, the
e¤ect of the reform on the total number is identied by the coe¢ cient trrf . We also compute
the percentage increase in the total number of foreigners as trrf
0+rf+tr
, where 0 + rf + tr is
the counterfactual number of foreigners that would have prevailed in the treatment group after
1991 in the absence of a reform.
In column (1) we dene control as the income group lying between 80% and 100% of the
scheme threshold level, and treatment as the the income group above the threshold level. Pre-
reform period is years 1980 to 1990 and post-reform is dened as years 1995-2000, in order
to estimate the longer term e¤ect of the reform. The estimated percentage increase in the
number of foreigners is 90% and precisely estimated. In column (2), we focus on the short term
e¤ect by comparing years 1991-1995 to 1980-1990. The e¤ect is still large and signicant, with
an estimated percentage increase of .65. In column (3), we estimate a placebo specication,
where the treatment group is constituted of individuals with income between .9 and 1 times
the threshold level, while the control group is constituted of individuals with income between
.8 and .9 times the threshold level. This specication is also a test for the presence of shifting
around the threshold in case of strong behavioral responses in terms of earnings or avoidance,
since shifting should produce a dip in the number of foreigners just below the threshold relative
to foreigners further down below the threshold. The coe¢ cient trrf is negative but very
small and not signicant, which conrms the graphical evidence that shifting behaviors are
second-order. In column (4), we use individuals with income above the 99.5-th percentile of the
income distribution as treatment, and individuals with income between the 96-th and the 99-th
percentile of the income distribution as control. The results are in line with column (1) and the
estimated percentage increase in high-skilled foreigners implied by the reform is 111%. We then
decompose the e¤ect by regions of origin in column (5) to (8). As suggested by gure 5, the
e¤ect of the reform is stronger among high-skilled individuals from English-speaking countries,
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with an estimated percentage increase of 112%.
Elasticity Estimate.
Based on the graphical evidence we have presented, we see that the number N of foreigners
above the threshold increases by about 100% relative to the number of foreigners slightly to
somewhat below the threshold. Our identication assumption is that all of this extra-increase is
due to the introduction of the tax scheme. As discussed above, this assumption is validated by
the pre-scheme data from 1980 to 1990 and with the post-scheme data when comparing various
control groups below the threshold.
The average tax rate  in the scheme is a at 25% while the tax rate outside scheme is
around 55%. This implies that the scheme produces an increase in the net-of-tax rate from
45% to 75%, i.e., a percent increase in the net-of-tax rate of 75/45-1=67%. Hence, the global
elasticity e is estimated as:
e =
1  
N
@N
@(1  ) '
1
0:67
= 1:5:
This is a very large elasticity. This elasticity applies for the existing scheme with its three year
duration. Conceivably, the elasticity for a scheme with indenite duration could be even higher.
This large elasticity implies that the tax revenue maximizing rate is   = 1=(1 + e) = 40%
using the conventional inverse elasticity formula. When taking into account the 20% VAT tax
(that applies to only to the fraction of consumption subject to the VAT rate) and the 8% payroll
tax, this shows that the 25% scheme tax is not very far from the tax revenue maximizing rate.
As we discussed in the theory section, the elasticity we have estimated can be due to (a) the
extensive margin of migration to Denmark of highly skilled foreigners due to lower average tax
rate of the scheme, (b) the intensive margin along the earnings level margin to take advantage
of the scheme that creates a notch in the individual budget set at the threshold of eligibility,
(c) the intensive margin along the duration of stay margin as the scheme lasts only three years.
3.2 Decomposing the Global Elasticity
Extensive Elasticity: Arrivals in Denmark.
Next, we analyze the response along the extensive margin, namely the migration to Denmark of
highly paid foreigners. Figure 9 reports the number of foreigners with earnings above the scheme
eligibility threshold (treatment series) arriving each year in Denmark from 1980 to 2006. As
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control groups, it reports the number of foreigners arriving in Denmark with earnings between
80% and 90% of the threshold (control 1) and with earnings between 90% and 99.5% of the
threshold (control 2). Both control series are normalized so that they match the treatment
series in 1990 the year before the scheme was rst implemented. The vertical line at year 1991
denotes the year the scheme was rst implemented. This gure is quantitatively very similar
to our initial graph with the absolute number of foreigners. It shows a slightly more than
doubling of arrivals of foreigners above the threshold relative to foreigners below the threshold.
This shows that the extensive arrival elasticity is even slightly higher than the global elasticity
we estimated initially. The di¤erence could be due to composition e¤ects as people attracted
to Denmark because of the scheme might have lower durations of stay than people coming to
Denmark absent the scheme.
Intensive Elasticity along the Earnings Margin
In order to analyze the intensive elasticity along the earnings level margin, we exploit the fact
that the scheme creates a notch in the individual budget set as eligibility kicks in above a xed
threshold. As we described in the theory section, behavioral responses to take advantage of
the notch could be along the labor supply margin (working more to earn more and qualify for
the scheme) or the tax avoidance margin (adjusting the form of compensation to increase cash
compensation to qualify for the scheme at the expense of other compensation). Such behavioral
responses should create a piling up in the earnings density of foreigners at the earnings threshold
along with a gap just below the threshold.
To examine this, Figure 10 plots such densities before the scheme was introduced (1988-
1990 in light grey) and after the scheme was introduced (1995-1997 in black). The vertical line
denotes the threshold and the x-axis is normalized so that zero corresponds to the threshold.
The density is smooth around the threshold before the scheme was introduced. After the scheme
was introduced, the density is virtually identical below the threshold, but two di¤erences appear
above the threshold. First, the density is everywhere higher above the threshold consistent with
a strong migration response at all earnings levels above the threshold. Second, there is clear
bunching at the threshold, but with only a very small dip to the left of threshold. Even though
the bunching is clearly visible in the gure and therefore provides very compelling evidence of a
behavioral response , it is in reality very modest relative to the extremely large notch in budget
set created by the scheme.
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Using the methodology developed by Kleven and Waseem (2011), we can estimate that the
spike at the notch point translates into an elasticity of earnings with respect to the marginal
net-of-tax rate that is extremely small, less than .01. This estimation assumes iso-elastic utility
with no income e¤ects in which case the intensive earnings elasticity e with respect to the
marginal net-of-tax rate is determined by
z  z
z
= (1 + e)
1   s
1   d   e

z
z  z
 1
e
;
where  s is the average tax rate under the scheme,  d is the average tax rate in the regular tax
schedule, z is the earnings cuto¤, and z is the earnings response by the marginal bunching
individual as described in the theory section. The earnings response z can be determined as
described in section 2.2 based on the amount of excess bunching at the notch relative to the
local counterfactual density, absent the notch.
Using Figure 10, we have z ' 10; 000 kroner as the excess mass at the notch point
corresponds roughly to the density mass between the threshold and the threshold + 10,000
kroner. Moreover, we have z ' 550; 000 kroner (scheme eligibility threshold in the mid-1990s
shown in the gure) along with average income tax rates  d = 45% below the cuto¤ and
 s = 25% above the cuto¤. Using those numbers in the formula above, we obtain e ' :004.
This elasticity is extremely tiny as the amount of bunching, although signicant, is very modest
relative to the enormous change in average tax rate of 20 points at the notch.11 For example,
even a modest elasticity of 0.1 would translate into a z of around 100,000 kroner, i.e., a
massively large amount of bunching.
Naturally, it is possible that this elasticity is so tiny because of large frictions in the ability
of highly paid foreigners to adjust their labor supply and earnings as in the theory proposed by
Chetty (2011). In the particular case of the scheme, such an adjustment needs to be negotiated
between the employee and the employer before hiring takes place and while the worker is still
abroad as only new immigrants are eligible for the scheme. Hence, such an agreement might be
di¢ cult to set-up unless employers actively cooperate. As scheme workers are so few, employers
may not want to systematically change their behavior to accommodate them as in the theory
proposed by Chetty et al. (2011) following their kink bunching analysis in Denmark. Therefore,
11Kleven and Waseem (2011) obtain larger but still quantitatively small elasticities of .05-.1 for the self-
employed and .01-.04 for wage earners in the case of Pakistan where the jumps in average tax rates are much
smaller, around 1%, and yet observable bunching is larger than in the case of the Danish tax scheme.
150
our result does not imply that the intensive elasticity of earnings with respect to the net-of-
tax rate for highly paid foreigners is zero in all circumstances but rather that it is zero in this
particular case.12 In particular, this implies that rms and foreign workers are almost completely
unable to game the system by manipulating earnings to take advantage of the scheme. Hence, we
can conclude with great condence that earnings manipulation or labor supply changes around
the scheme notch does not a¤ect our core migration e¤ects that are the primary focus of our
analysis.
Intensive Elasticity along Duration Margin
In order to analyze the intensive elasticity along the duration of stay margin, we exploit the
fact that the scheme creates a kink in the individual life-time budget set as the scheme lasts
for only 3 years. As we explained in the theory section, a number of individuals should stay
exactly 3 years and hence create bunching in the density of stay durations at 3 years. To
examine this, Figure 11 reports the density of duration of foreigners with (annualized) earnings
above percentile 99.5th (P99.5-100) and hence above the eligibility threshold for the scheme
and earnings between percentile 96 and percentile 99 (P96-99) and hence below the eligibility
threshold for the scheme. Panel A is for years 1991-2005 (after the scheme was implemented)
while Panel B is a control graph for years 1980-1990 (before the scheme was implemented).
There is a clear spike at 3 years only in the upper group eligible for the scheme after the scheme
was implemented providing very strong compelling evidence of an intensive response along the
duration margin.
However, the spike is small relative to the large change in marginal incentives created the
scheme. Figure 12 depicts the density of duration of foreigners with (annualized) earnings
above percentile 99.5th for years 1991-2005, zooming around the 3-year cut-o¤ date. The excess
bunching at the kink represents about 2 month = 2/12 year of density. Let us denote by y
this excess bunching (expressed in duration density equivalent terms). Using the methodology
of Saez (2010), the intensive elasticity eI can be estimated using the formula
eI ' log(1 + y
=y)
log((1   s)=(1   d)) =
log(1 + 2=36)
log((1  :25)=(1  :55)) = :106
where  s = :25 is the average tax rate on the scheme and  d = :55 is the average tax rate on the
12Recent estimations of intensive elasticities of earnings among all workers in Denmark from Chetty et al.
(2011) and Kleven and Schultz (2011) based on very compelling bunching evidence and tax reforms evidence
(respectively) nd positive but modest elasticities around 0.1 still much smaller than the migration elasticity we
have found.
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regular schedule. This formula applies for large changes in marginal incentives (as is the case
for the scheme) for iso-elastic utilities with no income e¤ects. Therefore, the intensive elasticity
along the duration margin is also very small relative to the total elasticity.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
Our paper has analyzed the e¤ects of income taxation on the international migration of top
earners using the Danish tax scheme introduced in 1991 that o¤ers preferential tax treatment to
highly paid migrants to Denmark. This scheme o¤ers a unique opportunity to credibly estimate
elasticities of international mobility with respect to tax rates. Using population wide Danish
administrative tax data, we have shown that the scheme doubled the number of highly paid
foreigners in Denmark relative to slightly less paid ineligible foreigners, which translates into a
very large elasticity of migration with respect to the net-of-tax rate around 1.5. We have shown
that there is a signicant but quantitatively very small response along the intensive earnings
margin (work e¤ort or earnings manipulation through tax avoidance). There is also evidence
of sharp bunching of durations of stay of highly paid foreigners at the three year duration limit
which translates into a signicant but quantitatively small intensive elasticity of duration with
respect to the net-of-tax rate. In the end, the migration elasticity is much more larger than
the conventional within country elasticity of earnings with respect to the net-of-tax rate. As
is the case for wealth mobility across countries (Kanbur and Keen, 1993), it is conceivable
that elasticities are particularly large from small countriessuch as Denmarkand that those
small countries have the most to gain from preferential tax schemes for foreigners. Hence,
tax heavens for highly skilled workers are likely to generate severe tax competition across
European countries and severely limit the ability of European governments to use progressive
taxation. This will require international coordination and the design of rules regulating such
special schemes particularly in the European union.
Another important rationale put forward by Danish tax authorities as well as other European
governments which have adopted similar preferential tax scheme for highly paid foreigners is
that highly skilled workers generate positive externalities on their co-workers and the economy
at large. The analysis of spillovers from human capital through knowledge di¤usion has a
long tradition in economics dating back to Marshall (1890) and has been used extensively in
theoretical endogenous growth models. There is also substantial work in the urban economics
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literature trying to uncover such spillover e¤ects empirically (see e.g., Moretti, 2004). The
Danish scheme creates a large and exogenous inux of highly skilled workers in the Danish
economy, concentrated among specic industries. Therefore, in future work, we hope to make
progress on estimating spillovers of scheme workers on co-workers and broader economic growth
in two ways.
First, we could use a Bartik type instrument measure for the exposure of each industry or
rm to the scheme. The instrument would be the fraction of highly paid foreign workers in
the industry or individual rm just before the introduction of the scheme. This would allow us
to measure the e¤ect of attracting scheme workers on wage dynamics of domestic workers or
non eligible foreigners as well as rmshiring and growth behavior. Second, we plan to study
specically the researcher part of the scheme that we have not analyzed in this paper. We plan
to analyze the e¤ect of the inux of researchers in Denmark on the patents, publications, and
placement of Ph.D. candidates of Danish research centers vs. comparable European countries
such as Sweden. The comparison could be done across academic elds using the pre-scheme
fraction of foreign researchers across elds.
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